AN

EXPOSITION

OF

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

OF

GRAND MILITARY COMBINATIONS AND MOVEMENTS,

COMPILED FROM

THE TREATISE UPON GREAT MILITARY OPERATIONS

BY

THE BARON DE JOMINI,

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WITH REMARKS ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE EFFICIENT CONSTITUTION OF ARMIES, FROM THE SAME AUTHOR.

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"Il a existé de tous temps des principes fondamentaux, sur lesquels reposent les bonnes combinaisons de la guerre, et auxquels on doit toutes les rapporter pour juger de leur véritable mérite.

"Ces principes sont immuables, independans de l'espèce d'armes, des temps, et des lieux. Le génie et l'experience indiquent les variations dont leur application est susceptible."

Jomini, Traités des Grandes Opérations Militaires, t. iii. ch. 35.

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PREFACE.

The Treatise upon great Military Operations by the Baron de Jomini is too well known to men of military science in general, and too highly appreciated by them, to render necessary any eulogy of his work on my part. Nor is it with any idea of supplying the want of such a treatise upon the first principles of war in the English language that the present compilation is undertaken; but rather with a view to render those principles familiar to the mind of every British officer; to impress upon them that war is indeed a science to be studied, as well as an art to be practised; and that something more is necessary to the formation of a commander, than mere readiness at the drill, or skill in the discipline of a regiment.

The Author indeed is far from indulging

the presumption that this feeling is not already entertained by most of those who have risen, and by many who hope to rise to command; but he is also aware that, in times of peace especially, when no prospect of their immediate application is offered to the view, the deduction of abstract military principles from a long and minute detail of experimental facts, is not readily entered upon by the younger branches of the service. The expense too, as well as the size of the Baron de Jomini's work, is sufficient to render it a stranger to the private libraries of most military men; and the study of it, also, may be esteemed dry and tedious by many officers, whose habits, however active, may nevertheless admit of their attending with pleasure to this concise exposition of its principles.

It is to be feared that some may undervalue all general principles as speculative, and that men who delight in boldness and activity may despise the theory which would regulate and direct their efforts. It will suffice, as a warning to them, to cite the example of General Blake who commanded the Spanish army which surrendered Valencia to Marshal

Suchet in 1812. The following comments are made on his conduct, by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, a distinguished officer of the Royal Engineers, and Author of an excellent work entitled "An Account of the War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France."

"The unskilful manœuvres of General Blake in shutting up his army in Valencia, and his surrender after such a short resistance, have left great suspicions of *his integrity.* It is however unjust to impute actions to *base motives,* because they are *otherwise incomprehensible;* and instances are not rare of a life of heroism and boldness being shaded over by a last act of weakness, or imbecility: besides confidence is *not always accompanied* by *resource.*"

"Blake served in 1793 and 1794 with distinction at the head of a battalion, in which situation, his regular habits and personal courage fitted him to shine. At the battle of Rio Séco, he commanded the brigade which preserved the most order, and covered the retreat; and, at Albuera, gave further proofs of bravery and good arrangement in the charge of a division. Placed however repeat-

edly in the command of armies, he afforded an impressive lesson that *courage* and *enterprize* are of little value unless blended with *prudence* and *judgment*," a too presumptuous confidence having rendered his career almost invariably disastrous." It is evident, from the history of his operations, that this want of prudence and judgment consisted either in a total disregard or ignorance of the first principles of war, and was exemplified by a constant departure from them.

This is not a period when the study of these principles should be neglected by the British army; for it is continually pressing upon the eye of the most superficial observer, that the wealth and pre-eminence, together with the liberty of England, have a tendency to make her an object of the envy and jealousy of the continental powers. And if, as has been stated by a leading minister of the cabinet, England must enter into future wars as a principal, and fight her own battles with all her might and strength, surely it is an object of no slight importance to give that turn to the pursuits of her military which shall furnish her energies with suitable direc-

tors, and not to leave it to be shown by Englishmen, as by the Prussians, in the commencement of the French revolution, that *first rate courage* and *most perfect discipline* can be misapplied, so as to make defeat only the more ignominious, and recovery the more hopeless.

"The idea of reducing the system of war to natural combinations," says Jomini, "to a theory at once simple and exact, presents a crowd of advantages; it renders instruction more easy, corrects the judgment of military operations, by referring them to a standard which is always just, and consequently makes faults less frequent, since it furnishes a guide for the conduct of every general."

"If the executive directory had known and thoroughly seized upon the spirit of this fundamental combination, they would not have formed that double line of manœuvre in an exterior direction, by which they obliged their armies of the Rhine and of the Sambre and Meuse rapidly to abandon Germany in 1796; nor would they, in 1799, have sacrificed those of the Danube and of Italy to false combinations, nor caused the failure of the

isolated and multiplied attacks which sprung from them. If Wurmser had profited by the sublime lessons of Frederick, and had not, unhesitatingly, formed his army into two corps, separated by a lake, those corps would not have been beaten one after the other; if he had not thus divided in the hope of covering every point, he would not have exposed himself to the terrible results of the march of Napoleon upon Trent and Bassano. Lastly, it is known, that if Alvinzi, Cobourg, the Prince of Lorraine, and Brown, had not acted against the first principles of war, they would not have been overwhelmed in detail.

"This," says Jomini, "was written in 1804; since which, Europe has changed face from the same causes. Its governments have not been contented with being in their policy successively overwhelmed, but their armies have imitated their errors. The dispersion of the forces of Mack; the false dispositions of Weyrother at Austerlitz; the formation of three corps at Jena, Weimar, and Auerstadt; the isolation of Buxhowden and Benningsen at Pultusk; that of the two Austrian armies at Abensburgh, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbon, are

examples, and furnish abundant testimony to the truth of the First Principles.

"Military annals offer many similar examples, indubitable proofs that reverses as well as successes have their causes in the same primitive truths; under different forms, perhaps, with modifications produced by accidents of ground, by the respective positions of armies, and by manœuvres analogous to these positions. It will not then be denied, that the single principle to which these causes of success or reverse are to be attributed, *must be the base of all the combinations of the art*, and the *only standard* by which their *truth* or *falsehood* can be estimated.

"The bold opinion I have here advanced will find a great number of censors; however, I am persuaded that, by *that class of studious men*, of *scientific soldiers*, the *suffrages of whom alone* I desire, it will be allowed to be a *grand truth*."

Warmly influenced by these feelings, I have attempted this compilation of the first principles of war; and should it lead any officer to the perusal of the original work whence it is deduced, and to the study of that system of

war of which the Baron de Jomini is the advocate; should it, in short, promote a habit of enlarged military reflection amongst the British army, it will be the gratification of the Author to have been so far the means of turning the talents of the Baron into an engine of defence against those very attacks upon England which they have been every where dedicated to support.

INTRODUCTION.



Within the last century, two military phenomena have appeared in the world, the brilliancy of whose career has dazzled and astonished the nations of Europe. Frederick the Great, by his successful defence of Prussia against the colossal forces that threatened to overwhelm it, and Napoleon Buonaparte, by his rapid conquest of nearly the whole continent, have established an era in military history, which will be well worth the attentive consideration of the soldier for future ages. The operations of the latter commander were so vast in their extent, and so unprecedented, at least in the annals of civilized Europe, in their rapidity and success, that the vulgar looked at them rather as the effects of magic, than as the natural result of the application of a system founded on truth, in opposition to another which had long tottered on error. It seemed as if the balance of power, the subject of so many bloody contests, had at last vanished at the nod of this European Tamerlane.

The principles by which he conquered have however been applied to his overthrow, and the equi-

librium of nations has been restored. The Baron de Jomini is one who has been educated in his school, and who has developed with peculiar force and clearness the natural causes of victories which had stupified the world. He has given a detailed history of the Seven Years' war, and of the wars of the French Revolution. From the first of these, as from a fund of experiments, he has deduced those *universal principles* and *general rules*, by the adoption of which success may be, if not commanded, at least rendered most probable; and has established their truth, more particularly by a comparison of the operations of Frederick and his opponents with those of Napoleon and of the generals who have acted on his system.

It will not be consistent with the intention of this work to enter into such a proof of the truth of these principles, but, taking them for granted, it will be sufficient to give a few examples explanatory of their application. The Baron de Jomini has considered the art or rather science of war in two lights, relatively to the conduct of a campaign, and to the fighting of a battle. The base of all his reasoning is this—that the courage and discipline, in short, the effective powers, of the troops being, as in Europe they may in general be assumed to be, nearly the same; the action of the greatest mass upon a given point in the field either of a campaign, or a battle, must prevail; or in

other words, that the greater force must overcome the less. The grand object is then first to know the point upon which this concentrated effort should be made: secondly, so to make it, as that the adversary shall not be prepared to meet it by an effort equally concentrated on that point. This may be said to be the outline of military science. The detail consists in the various means to be used to this grand end of bringing an overwhelming mass into action upon the decisive point of a line of operations or of a field of battle. These means are marches or strategic movements and manœuvres, or the practice of the orders of attack.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITIONS.

Upon Lines of Operation.

PREVIOUSLY to entering upon a consideration of those general rules for the conduct of military operations, which are to be deduced from the first principle stated in the Introduction, it will be necessary to give definitions of the terms peculiar to what may be justly called the Science of War. The first and most general is

A Line of Operation.

Lines of Operation are those upon which an army may be moved, or disposed, either for the attack or defence of states. They are divided, first, into Territorial Lines—which are those which have been traced either by nature or art; such are frontiers covered by fortresses, or defended by natural obstacles. Chains of mountains, great rivers, the sea, any insurmountable obstacles, all these enter into the class of Territorial Lines of Operation. Were France to attack Austria, the three great territorial lines of operation for its armies would be, Italy on the right, Switzerland and the Tyrol on the centre, and Germany

on the left. The most natural by which to enter Germany would be those of the Maine and Danube.

The second division of the lines of operation is into

Lines of Manœuvre:

by which are meant the lines upon which a general disposes or marches his troops, either for attack or defence. In 1756 Frederick the Great entered Bohemia, by its central line or direction of operation, and upon four points, and of course with four corps d'armée, thus forming four lines of manœuvre. The French armies invaded Germany in 1796 and 1799, in two subdivided corps, thus forming as many lines of manœuvre. Napoleon never operated but with one concentrated mass, and consequently upon one principal line of manœuvre.

Lines of operation have generally been considered only with a view to the connections of armies with the material of war. Lloyd and Bulow have given them but a relative value to the magazines and depôts of armies; and this last has even advanced that there is no longer any line of operation when the army is encamped near its magazines. The following example will suffice to destroy this paradox—Suppose two armies encamped, the one upon the Upper Rhine, before Brisac; the other upon the Lower Rhine, in front

of Dusseldorf, or any other point of this frontier. Let their grand depôts be close in their rear, on the other side of the river, which is undoubtedly the safest and most advantageous position for them. These armies have a point to seize upon, or to defend; then they have territorial lines, and lines of manœuvre. In the first place, their defensive territorial line extends from their position to that point in their rear which they ought to cover, and they will be cut off if the enemy should establish himself upon this line.

The army of Melas might have had ten years provision in Alexandria, and yet not have been the less cut off from its line of defence, as soon as the victorious enemy occupied that of the Po in its rear. In the second place, their lines of manœuvre are double, being those formed by two corps d'armée, and will become single as soon as the two corps shall unite and form one mass.

The relations borne by the lines of manœuvre to those traced by nature, to the enemy's positions, and to the views of the commander in chief, form so many different classes which take their names from the nature of those relations. These will be the subject of the following Chapter.

CHAPTER II.

DEFINITIONS.

Lines of Manœuvre.

In the preceding Chapter it has been shown that lines of manœuvre are distinguished from territorial lines of operation, as being the direction of march chosen by the general of an army, whereas the latter are those pointed out by localities either of nature or art. It has also been said that these lines of manœuvre are themselves varied in their nature according to the relation they bear to the territorial lines of operation, to the enemy's positions, and to the views of the commander in chief.

The first class of lines of manœuvre I shall then call

Single Lines of Manœuvre,

which are those of an army acting in one body upon a single territorial line of operation.

The second class is that of

Double and Multiplied Lines of Manœuvre:

which are those of an army operating on one

frontier, but forming two or more corps, which act independently upon separate lines of operation, towards one or several ends.

The third class is that of

Interior Lines of Manœuvre;

which are those formed by an army to oppose several lines of operation of the enemy. To these opposing lines an interior direction is given, so as to approach them, and connect the movements of the divisions which act upon them, in order to prevent any of them being overwhelmed by a larger mass of the enemy's force.

The fourth class I shall call

Exterior Lines of Manœuvre.

These have an opposite tendency to the latter. They are formed by the divisions of an army, which acts at the same time upon the extremities of one or several lines of operation of the enemy. They are of course therefore divergent, whereas the interior lines are convergent.

The fifth class comprises

Lines of Manœuvre upon an extended Front.

These are the lines of march taken by the isolated divisions of an army acting on an extensive frontier or line of frontiers; these divisions

being, of course, but parts of the same mass, and operating to the same end.

Under this denomination are also included lines of manœuvre formed by two distinct corps upon a single line of frontier; they then form double lines upon a grand front.

The sixth class are

Deep Lines of Manœuvre;

which are those of great length from the base whence they start, to the point to which they are intended to extend.

The seventh are

Concentric Lines;

which, starting from distant points, are united either in front or rear of their base.

The eighth are

Eccentric Lines;

which are formed by an army intending to act on several diverging lines.

The ninth are called

Secondary Lines.

A term which marks the relative importance of

two armies between each other when acting upon the same frontier. For instance, in the year 1796, the French army of the Sambre and Meuse acted upon a secondary line to that of the army of the Rhine. The movements of the first being secondary to, and dependent upon, those of the latter.

The tenth class I shall call

Accidental Lines of Manœuvre;

which are the changes made in the direction of the operations of an army, from that intended in the original plan of the campaign. These changes are uncommon, and of the greatest importance, and are seldom well seized upon but by a most vigilant and active genius.

CHAPTER III.

UPON THE GENERAL COMBINATIONS OF THE SCIENCE OF WAR.

The science of war is composed of three general combinations, each of which admits but of few subdivisions, or means of execution. The only perfect operations are those which present the application of these three combinations, because this is the application of the general principle advanced in the Introduction.

The first of these combinations is the art of embracing the lines of operation in the most advantageous manner. It is what is commonly, although improperly, called the plan of a campaign. It is impossible to make a general plan for a whole campaign, the first movement of which may alter every thing, and in which it is not possible to foresee beyond the second movement.

The second combination is the art of bringing the mass of one's forces as rapidly as possible on the decisive point of the primitive line of operation, or of the accidental line. It is what is vulgarly called strategy, but strategy relates

only to the mode of executing this second combination.

The third branch of war is the art of combining the simultaneous action of the great mass of an army upon the decisive point of a field of battle. It is properly the art of combats, which many authors have called the order of battle, and which others have treated of under the name of tactics.

CHAPTER IV.

UPON THE ART OF EMBRACING THE LINES OF OPERATION.

It has been stated in the last chapter that the art of embracing the lines of operation, or, in other words, of disposing one's troops, and directing their marches for the purposes of attack or defence, is what is commonly, although improperly, called the art of planning a campaign. The fact is, that the plan of a campaign depends upon six essential considerations, some of which are variable in their nature and must often vary in the course of operations. They are, 1st, The political situation of the two parties; 2dly, Their actual condition; 3dly, Their relative force and warlike means; 4thly, The repartition and position of their armies; 5thly, The natural line of operations; 6thly, The most advantageous line of operations.

It is not pretended that it is necessary to draw up the plan of a campaign only from an exact estimate of the means of war, it need but be granted that they are of great importance to it. These plans, which are indeed no more than the choice of lines of operation and manœuvre, are subject to many accessary considerations, which

however ought to be subordinate to the rules of the art, to the invariable principles which are acknowledged to form its base. Boldness, even to audacity, a quality often so necessary and decisive in war, is perfectly compatible with their application, of which the greatest proofs that history can furnish us with, are the operations of the French army of reserve in 1800. No enterprise could be bolder, or abound more in grand combinations, at the same time that none could be more prudent or wise, since it menaced the enemy with total ruin, without risking more than the extreme rear-guard. In recurring then to these invariable principles, we shall find that they are all deducible from the first general axiom established in the Introduction, that the action of the greater number of men upon a given point, ought and must, cæteris paribus, to gain the day. Therefore the whole art of embracing the lines of operation consists, first, in rightly choosing our territorial line of operation; secondly, in so disposing our lines of manœuvre with regard to it, and the opposing lines of the enemy, as to bring a superior mass of force in action with regard to the object of our pursuit.

There are but three points upon which the lines of operation should conduct, i. e. upon the extremities, or the centre of the enemy's line of defence. The most advantageous direction is

upon an extremity, and thence upon the rear of the enemy, or, if his line of defence be exceedingly extended, it will then be on the centre. By moving with rapidity upon an extremity of his defensive line, the enemy may be cut off from his base of operation, (i. e. from the point to be defended.) A march upon the centre would tend to intercept his communication with his secondary line of operations, or co-operating army. It is in doing this, that, according to Buonaparte, the whole secret of war consists. The configuration of the frontiers may be of great importance in the choice of lines of operation. Central positions, the outlines of which form a salient angle towards the enemy, as, for instance, Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because the lines of operation which cross them are naturally interior in their direction, and they also conduct upon the rear or upon an extremity of the enemy's line of defence. The flanks of this salient angle are therefore of such importance, that all the resources of art and nature should be combined to render them unattackable.

In the absence of the central positions, one may supply them by the relative direction given to the lines of manœuvre; as shown by figure I. Plate II.

B represents an army manœuvring on the right flank of A. and D one on the left flank of C:

E E are lines of manœuvre. It is evident that from the direction of their lines of manœuvre, B and D will always be able to unite, and to overwhelm alternately A and C.

The great *mass of force* ought to be directed upon the decisive point or key of the territorial line, or line of operation, i. e. upon the centre, if the enemy has committed the error of scattering his forces; or upon one of the two extremities if he remain in continued line. In this last case, one ought to choose that of the two extremities, by acting upon which, one can force the enemy to retire upon an insurmountable obstacle, or can intercept his communications without endangering one's own.

It may here be remarked that a retreating army is not always obliged to regain its own frontiers; it may, on the contrary, change the direction of its operations, and remove the theatre of war from its own country, by a march parallel to its line of defence; as shown by the figure 2. Plate II.

A B represents the line of battle of an army—C D points out the line of its retreat, which is parallel to its frontier E F.

Finally, it may be said in general, that the direction of the lines of manœuvre should be such, as should give every chance of decisive victory, and oblige the enemy to decide the fate of their

army. The attack must also be vigorous, and if repulsed, must be repeated with every advantage that can be procured from superiority of numbers, and the commanding direction of the lines of manœuvre. And in this manner the efforts of the assailants must be reiterated, with increased fury, and unhesitating resolution, until the point be gained. It may also be established, as a general maxim, that the invasion of a country cannot be prevented by the mere occupation of the very best defensive positions. This can be done only by the manœuvres of the defenders, not by any positions they can take up. It is asserted by the experience of ages, that no position, however strong, can be tenable against the attack of an enemy who is at liberty to exert the greater part of his force upon one point, whilst, by a small remainder, he keeps the main body of the defendants upon the watch at several points. It follows that the employment of concentrated forces upon the decisive point of the field of contest, is essential to all good combinations, and is independent of all circumstances.

Having thus given the general *military* principles by which the choice of territorial lines of operation should be directed, I proceed to state those which should influence the selection of lines of manœuvre. In the first place, single lines of manœuvre upon single lines of operation are the

best, because, as they give the greatest possible union and force to the body which acts upon them, they also give the fewest chances of success to the enemy.

Secondly. Interior lines of manœuvre are superior to exterior ones for nearly the same reasons as those alleged for the preference of single lines. Interior lines combine, exterior lines separate, the exertions of an army.

It is evident that two or more isolated corps, acting on exterior lines of manœuvre, although they should be collectively equal or superior in force to the enemy, yet if that enemy operate upon single or interior lines of manœuvre, these corps will never succeed, because it is necessary to this purpose that their combined force should act simultaneously upon him, which combined action is incompatible with exterior lines of manœuvre, or, in other words, with marches of diverging directions. On the contrary, central positions, and interior lines of manœuvre, are advantageous when opposed to exterior ones, because they give the power of concentrating with greater rapidity than the enemy can, and of thus overwhelming his isolated divisions with united forces.

Double lines of manœuvre can be good only when opposed to the same, or to multiplied ones, in which case they should be interior in their

directions, and those of the enemy exterior. The principle should always be kept in view, that the power of most rapid concentration upon the decisive point is the guarantee to victory. Thus may one division be left, to keep one portion of the enemy in check by taking advantage of strong positions, whilst the main body of the army may rapidly march upon and overwhelm in succession the remaining scattered divisions of the enemy. The retreat of this division must at the same time be always directed upon the main body.

It is also to be observed that armies or divisions of armies, acting upon two interior lines for mutual support, in opposition to others acting upon exterior lines at a certain distance from each other, must avoid being closed into too small a space by the enemy, where his divisions might act simultaneously, and they must also, on the other hand, not diverge to too great a distance from each other, so as to lose the advantage of mutual support.

Small armies should *always act in one body.* It is by adherence to this principle only, that they can achieve any enterprise of importance; they must renounce every other consideration for the main object of their pursuit. The chief of a small army should have his eyes constantly fixed upon his adversary, and not only profit by his faults, but also provoke him to commit them, by inducing

him to weaken himself by enterprises upon fortresses, and by other diversions. Then he may, by a rapid and concentrated movement, fall upon one of those detachments, and destroy it before it be supported. Such operations restore numerical equality, and double the moral force of an inferior army. An army which is acting upon a double and interior line of manœuvre, or upon a single central line, against armies operating upon two lines of manœuvre at a great distance from each other, ought not to meet them too soon, but should let them approach to such a distance, as that it can rapidly march and overwhelm the one, without at the same time losing the power of returning to the attack of the other.

It may be presumed that an army in retreat is always, both physically and morally, inferior to its enemy, because it retires either in consequence of reverses, or of its numerical inferiority. It must then never be still further weakened by a division of its forces upon what are called eccentric lines of retreat. This mode of retreat has been recommended by Bulow, as covering a great extent of country, and menacing the flanks of the adversary by both extremities of the retiring army. The fact is, however, that these diverging columns would be too weak to act with effect, upon every point, against the concentrated force of the pursuers. Retreats may be executed by several

columns in order to render the march more rapid and easy, but these columns should always be able to support each other, and to concentrate in case they should be required to resist the enemy.

These principles, so clearly stated, must carry their own evidence with them to the mind of every one who has admitted the postulate mentioned in the Introduction; a postulate which the most experienced officers will, I believe, be most ready to allow.

CHAPTER V.

UPON THE ART OF EMBRACING THE LINES OF OPERATION.

In the last chapter I have endeavoured to place, in as clear a light as possible, the general principles by which the choice of territorial lines of operation and of lines of manœuvre should be regulated, or to speak less scientifically, the principles by which a general should be directed in the selection of his lines of march, and in the disposition and division of his troops. It is evident that they all immediately result from the principle, that victory belongs to the exertion of the greater power, and that where all the energies of each are judiciously brought into exercise, the smaller army must always yield to the greater. Disheartening as this principle may appear to those who may think themselves doomed for the most part to belong to the weakest party in the field, it ought, upon attentive consideration, to redouble their desire of thoroughly understanding the nature of military science, in order that, by an ingenious application of its principles, they may compensate to their country for the deficiency

of its military resources. The history of war furnishes abundant instances in which rapid and judicious movements—daring, but well directed blows—have triumphed over the array of immense, but ill-employed forces, and reduced, as in the instance of the Great Frederick at Leuthen, the proud insulters of the petty parade at Potsdam, to fly before the handful of heroes they had despised. To induce to a critical study of the military lessons afforded us in the wars of the last century, and also more particularly to exemplify and impress the maxims I have already given, I shall make the following extracts, verbatim, from Jomini, trusting that they will be sufficient to show the nature and importance of that choice of territorial lines and lines of manœuvre, which Jomini has styled, the art of embracing the lines of operation. I shall begin with his remarks on the seven years' war.

"In applying the maxims of war," says Jomini, "to the different lines of operation chosen by Frederick the Great, one is obliged to acknowledge, that the accidental plans, to which, in the course of a campaign, he was prompted by the turn of events, were much superior to his primitive plans.

"By inspection of a map of Germany, it will be seen that Prussia had three lines of operation against Austria; that of the left against Moravia,

that of the centre against Bohemia, and that of the right against Saxony. The first was the most favourable to operations, in a military sense, because the communications were there less difficult, because also, if Frederick pushed his views as far as Vienna, the centre of his enemy's power, this line conducted him there most rapidly and with least difficulty: if, however, on the contrary, he limited them to projects upon the provinces bordering his estates; it then became the longest of the three, being the most distant from Brandenburgh, the centre of his own power.

"The king well knew that there existed a coalition against him, and if not acquainted with all its members, he was aware that it was formidable. The preparations of Austria had occasioned some diplomatic communications, and Frederick, convinced that they were trifling with him, resolved to be beforehand with his enemies, and to attack that one whom he most feared. But his choice of the lines of operation did not answer his intention. He hoped to strike a terrible blow against Austria, and to frighten the others, so as to prevent their acting simultaneously; yet he did nothing to procure this result. He commenced in 1756 with seizing upon Saxony, intending thereby to secure his hereditary dominions from invasion, to reinforce his armies with the Saxon troops, to recruit them from the population of the

Electorate, to administer its government, to make it, in a word, a Prussian province. The event proved it did not altogether answer his expectations. However, having made himself master of it, nothing prevented his entering Moravia the next year, as he did, when too late; yet he fought uselessly the bloody battles of Prague and Kolin, whilst, by marching from Neiss, in Silesia, upon Olmutz, in Moravia, he would have defeated Daun, before Prince Charles of Lorraine could have arrived to his assistance, and if this Prince had marched to cover Vienna and the Danube, Prague and all Bohemia would have been at the disposal of the Prussians. It was, indeed, more probable that Frederick should reach Vienna by the line of Moravia, with 105 battalions and 160 squadrons, during the astonishment of his other enemies, than that he should resist, as he afterwards did, with only 80,000 men, and in his own dominions, when the Russians were masters of Prussia, the Swedes of Pomerania, the French of Saxony, and the Austrians of the half of Silesia. Ought he to have been detained by the fear of 20,000 Saxons, whom he would have left far away on his right flank, and who, besides, were not at war with him? If he had pushed on to the banks of the Danube, as it cannot be doubted he might have done, would not the intimidated Elector of Saxony have broken the forced ties which con-

nected him with Austria? He would have been cautious of attempting any thing against a prince who had made the first power in Europe tremble in its capital. When Frederick meditated the invasion of Saxony, it is certain that there were not 30,000 Austrians in Bohemia, nor 20,000 in Moravia. If at this epoch he had assembled his army at Neiss, to menace the two provinces at once and to preserve the division of the imperial forces, and had operated rapidly on his left, he would incontestably have destroyed the army of Moravia before it could have been supported. In fifteen days 80 Prussian battalions and 120 squadrons might easily have advanced to the gates of Vienna. They might have been covered by the rest of the army masking Olmutz. The Austrian troops, who guarded Bohemia, would have been embarrassed to find an outlet by which to unite themselves with the forces to succour the capital, and what would Frederick have risked in the enterprise? Nothing; but to give laws to Austria, or to retreat with the loss of some thousand men. This difference in the chances was the most powerful motive for trying them.

"It may be objected that the 30,000 Austrians, stationed in Bohemia, would have compromised the safety of the army; but, is it to be supposed that they would have remained quietly in that kingdom, to cut off the retreat of the Prussians,

whilst Vienna was on the point of falling? However, admitting this improbable supposition, would not the 25 battalions, left by the King in Moravia, have been more than sufficient to cover his line of operations? In order to cut off his retreat, would it not have been necessary to guard the lines of Saxony, Bohemia, and Moravia, upon a front of 150 leagues? 100,000 men are not so easily cut off from a frontier so extended, when conducted by a Frederick. If the 30,000 Austrians had retired upon the Danube, the King would have been able to bring up the corps left in Moravia, and to give a battle with the mass of his forces under the walls of Vienna, which would have decided the fate of Austria, and which, if lost, could have been followed only by the evacuation of the conquered provinces.

"The choice of the line of Moravia was commanded in 1756 and 1757; first, by the political situation of the two parties; secondly, by their relative force, since, instead of four armies, (as afterwards in 1758,) Frederick had only one to fight; thirdly, by the repartition and position of the enemies, who, according to the old Austrian system, called the war of position, were scattered in order to cover every point, and did not protect this province; fourthly, by the natural line of operations; fifthly, by its offering at the moment the most advantageous chances to the King.

"When Frederick carried the theatre of war there in 1758, this choice had its motive, on the contrary, only in the consideration of the natural lines, for the other chances had turned in favour of his enemies. If he had done in 1756 what he projected doing in 1758, it cannot be doubted that Austria would have been invaded, and within a few inches of ruin; that a part of its provinces would have paid the expenses of the war, and that Prussia would have acquired the superiority over her rival. There are many other equally striking examples of the importance of the choice of the line of operation, and of its influence upon the fate of armies and of empires."

"The manœuvres by which the King acted upon this, his ill-chosen territorial line, in 1756, were equally faulty, for they were double lines at great intervals, as shown by the figure 3, plate II.

"A great river, the Elbe, divided his two corps d'armée, distant from each other at least fifteen marches. Supposing the Austrians had occupied one of the two positions A or B, and had carried the mass of their forces upon either bank of the Elbe, C or D, destroying all the bridges, and clearing the whole course of the river, it is certain that they would have overwhelmed one of these corps. What then would have become of the other? Would it not have been forced to

retreat, as was the army of the Rhine, in a situation absolutely parallel, in 1796?

"The lines of manœuvre upon which the King acted, in the campaigns from 1759 to 1762, were always the same, because they were only defensive. The Russians acting in concert with the Austrians, he could not have continued, without danger, the war of invasion, which, by removing him to a distance from the centre of his power and resources, would have permitted one of the three hostile armies to do him irreparable injury. For the rest, he always manœuvred upon three interior lines, carrying the mass of his forces successively on each, while the corps acting on the two others maintained themselves by a well-combined defence.

"The first figure of Plate III. shows the advantage of these dispositions. The three interior lines, A, point out the three Prussian corps d'armée; the four exterior lines, B, those of their enemies. The King, by rapidly carrying his main body upon that of the three points, A, where the danger was most pressing, re-established his affairs there, and then flew to another.

"On perusing the narrative of the several campaigns of the Seven Years' war, one will be convinced, that if the King failed in his primitive plans, or choice of his first line of operation, the choice of his accidental line was always skilful.

His march against the combined army in Saxony, in 1757; his invasion of Bohemia, after raising the siege of Olmutz; the movements which followed his defeat at Hohenkirch, and by which he robbed Daun of the fruits of his victory; finally, his march into Silesia in 1760,—are master-pieces of the art.

"There is without doubt merit in combining well the plan of a campaign, but it is seldom that it can be entirely executed. An unforeseen event, such as the loss of a battle, sometimes changes completely the direction of the war. It is on these important occasions, at these critical moments, that the splendour of genius is shown. An ordinary general is almost always embarrassed: Frederick never was, and his sudden changes in his line of operations are lessons for the professor of the art of war. By his march into Bohemia, he established an important maxim; that of directing retreats parallel, instead of perpendicular, to one's own frontier. By its application, the Prussian army, instead of drawing the theatre of war into Silesia, carried it into their enemy's provinces. If the Austrians had profited by this lesson, they would not in the campaigns of the revolutionary war have abandoned so much country, nor suffered the theatre of operations to be carried in two campaigns from the banks of the Oise to those of the Danube.

These are sufficient proofs of the importance of accidental lines."

As a further proof of the effects of a good choice of lines of operation, and lines of manœuvre, I may refer to the campaigns of 1796 in Germany, as given by the Baron Jomini.

"The armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, start from the opposite extremities of a base, and take a concentric direction upon the Danube, they act upon two exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skilful than Cobourg, profits by the direction of his interior lines of manœuvre to give his army a nearer point of concentration; he seizes the moment at which the Danube covers the corps of Latour to steal some marches upon Moreau; and throws all his forces upon the right of Jourdan, whom he overwhelms. The battle of Wurtzburg decides the fate of Germany, and forces the army of Moreau, extended over an immense line, to retreat. Buonaparte commences his extraordinary career in Italy. His system is to isolate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies; he succeeds by the battle of Millesimo in making them take two exterior lines of manœuvre, and afterwards beat them successively at Mondovi, and at Lodi. A formidable army assembles in the Tyrol to save Mantua, which he is besieging; it has the imprudence to march on two lines separated by a lake. Quicker than lightning the

French general raises the siege, abandoning every thing, throws himself with the greater part of his forces upon the first column which debouches from Brescia, defeats it, and drives it back into the mountains. The second column arrives on the same ground, is beaten in its turn, and forced to retire into the Tyrol, to communicate with its right. Wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, attempts to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza. Buonaparte, after having overwhelmed and repulsed him on the first line to the Lawis, changes direction to the right, debouches by the vallies of Brenta upon the left line, and forces the remains of this fine army to take refuge in Mantua, where it is at last obliged to capitulate.

"In 1799, hostilities recommence; the French, although punished for having manœuvred on two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless form three, upon the Rhine and the Danube. On the left, one army observes the lower Rhine; on the centre, a second marches on the Danube; a third army, as strong as the other two, occupies Switzerland, which flanks Italy and Swabia. The three armies could not be united but in the valley of the Inn, at eighty leagues distance from the base of their operations. The Archduke has but equal forces; he unites them on the centre of the French, which he overwhelms at

Stockach, and the army of Helvetia is forced to evacuate the Grisons and east of Switzerland. The allies commit, in their turn, the same fault; and instead of pursuing the conquest of this central bulwark of France, which afterwards cost them so dear, they form a double line in Switzerland and on the lower Rhine. Their army of Switzerland is destroyed at Zurich, whilst that of the Rhine is amusing itself in the neighbourhood of Manheim. In Italy, the secondary line of Naples is formed, where 32,000 men are rendered useless; whilst the army upon the Adige, the decisive point of the field of operations, experiences fatal reverses from the inferiority of its force. When the army of Naples returns to the north, it again commits the fault of moving in an opposite direction to that commanded by Moreau. Suwaroff skilfully profits by the central position thus given to him; marches upon the first of these armies, and defeats it at a few leagues distance from the other.

In 1800, the face of affairs changes. Buonaparte is returned from Egypt; and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of operation. The French armies manœuvre on two interior lines, and reciprocally support each other. The Austrians are forced, on the contrary, to take exterior lines of manœuvre, thus preventing the communication of their armies. By this ma-

nœuvre, the army of reserve cuts off the enemy from his base of operations, and preserves itself in all its own relations, both with its frontiers and the army of the Rhine, its secondary line. This truth is demonstrated by figure 2. Plate III. in which the respective situation of the parties is represented. A A indicate the armies of reserve and of the Rhine. B B those of Melas and Kray, the Austrian generals. C C C C the passages of St. Bernard, of Simplon, of St. Gothard, and of Du Splugen. It is seen by this figure that Melas is cut off from his base, and that the French general, on the contrary, risks nothing, since he preserves all his communications with his frontiers and his secondary line.*

" The analysis of the memorable events of the revolutionary war, a sketch of but a part of which has been here attempted, will give convincing proof of the importance of the choice of lines of operation and manœuvre in war Indeed upon it depends the *safety and the loss of empires.* It may repair the *disasters of a defeat; render vain*

* Since 1803, when this was written, events equally brilliant, but not more scientifically combined, have been witnessed. The manœuvres of the French before Ulm and Jena; the march of the Russians upon Kaluga and Beresina; and that of the allies upon Leipsic, offer fresh applications of the principles of war, with even greater results.—*De Jomini, Traité des grandes Opérations.*

an invasion; extend the advantages of a victory, and assure the conquest of a country.

"By comparing the combinations and the results of the most celebrated campaigns, it will also be seen, that all the lines of operation, which have succeeded, have been in conformity with the general principles laid down: for simple lines, and interior lines, are intended to bring into action, on the most important point, and by means of strategic movements, a greater number of divisions, and consequently a greater force, than the enemy. It will also be equally evident, that all those which failed, contained vices opposed to these principles; since double exterior lines and multiplied lines present weak and isolated parts to the mass, which must overwhelm them.

"The principle of concentration is equally just, when applied to retreats and to invasions. When the first division of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Buonaparte re-assembled them all at Roverbella, and although he had only 40,000 men, he defeated 60,000, because he had to combat only with isolated columns. If he had made an eccentric retreat, upon the principles of Bulow, what would have become of his army and of his conquests? Wurmser, after this first check, made an eccentric retreat by directing his two wings upon the extremities of his base of

operations; what was the consequence? The right, although favoured by the mountains of the Tyrol, was beaten at Trent, and the left was afterwards destroyed at Bassano and Mantua."

In the last Chapter, I have stated, that central positions, and frontiers of saliant outline, are advantageous. "It is also to be remarked," says Jomini, "that the configuration of the theatre of war may be of similar importance to that of the frontiers. In fact, every theatre of war forms a figure of four sides. The better to explain this idea, I will cite the theatre of war of the French armies under Napoleon in 1806.

"The manœuvre of Napoleon on the Saale in 1806 was combined in the following manner. (See fig. 4. Plate II.) Leaving the base C D, he took up at Jena, and Naumburgh, the line F G H, and afterwards marched by Halle and Dessau, to drive back the Prussian army J. on the side A B formed by the sea. The fate of the remains of this army at Erfurt, Magdeburgh, Lubeck, and Prentzlow, is well known. The great art consists then in combining one's marches so as to seize upon the communications of the enemy without losing one's own. It is easily seen that the line F G H, by its prolonged position and by the crotchet left upon the extremity of the enemy, always preserves its communications with the base C D. This is exactly

the nature of the manœuvres at Marengo and Jena. When the theatre of operations is not in the neighbourhood of the sea, it must be bounded by some great neutral power, which will guard its own frontiers, and close one side of the square. Without doubt, this barrier is not equivalent to the sea, but in general it may be considered as an obstacle upon which it is dangerous to retire after a defeat, and upon which it is advantageous to push one's adversary. The territory of a power which has an army of 200,000 men, is not to be violated with impunity: and if a defeated army took this step, it would not be the less cut off from its base. If it be a small power which limits the theatre of war, then it must be included in it, and the sides of the square thrown back to the frontiers of some great neutral power, or to the sea.

"In order to conceive more correctly the ideas just presented, it will suffice to look at the theatre of war in Poland in 1806 and 1807. The Baltic Sea and the frontiers of Austrian Gallicia formed the two faces A B, C D, of the four sided fig. 4. Plate II. I think it was of importance to the two armies not to be thrown back upon either of these obstacles.

"The configuration of the frontiers will sometimes modify that of the four sided figure. It may have the shape of a parallelogram, or of a trapezium, as in figure 5. Plate II.

In this case, the army G H, having the command of the two sides A C, C D, will have additional advantages, since the base of the hostile army K, diminishing towards B D, makes it difficult for that army to regain its communications. The front of this base, being the least extensive, is the least favourable to K's manœuvring, whilst, on the contrary, it gives the army G H the means of operating with success, since the line of operation C D leads it naturally upon the communications of the enemy K, and since the space to be seized upon in order to cut it off, is the smallest, and consequently most easily occupied by a concentrated force.

"The theatre of war in Prussia and Poland, of which we have just spoken, was exactly similar to this figure The frontiers of Gallicia, extending to the Narew, formed with the line of the Vistula, the diminished side B D. The manner in which Napoleon embraced this line at Pultusk and Eylau was exactly the same with that here traced.

"It is hoped that the consideration of these examples will lead to the conviction, that the proper method of embracing a theatre of war is confined to a very small number of combinations, all flowing from the same principles, which are, first, to direct the mass of one's forces upon the decisive point of the line of operation: i. e. upon the centre, if the enemy's army is divided; upon one of the extremities if it be in continued line.

"Secondly, to attack, in this last case, that extremity which is opposite to an insurmountable obstacle, or by which one can get most easily upon the communications of the enemy, without losing one's own.

"Napoleon, by gaining, in 1805, Donawerth, and the line of the Leck, established his main body upon the communications of Mack with Vienna, which, with Bohemia, was the base of this general's line of operations; he also rendered it impossible for him to join the Russian army, which was the object of his most important secondary line of manœuvre. A similar operation took place in 1806, on the extreme left of the Prussians by Saalfield and Gera. It was repeated in 1812 by the Russian army, in its movements upon Kaluga and Krasnoi; and in 1813 by the allies, who directed their march upon Dresden and Leipsic, against the right of Napoleon.

"It has been remarked, that central lines have not saved Napoleon near Dresden in 1813, nor in Champagne in 1814; But I will observe, in answer, that it is nevertheless to this system, that he owed his momentary successes in these two campaigns. The cause of his reverses was in the inequality of the contest, and the inferiority of his secondary resources; it was in the different nature of his troops (drawn from a country exhausted by conscriptions), and in the position of Bohemia and

Bavaria in rear of his extreme right, and, so to speak, upon his communications. Besides, I will add, that until then, the system of central masses had not been applied, but by armies of 150, or 200,000 men, at most, and that it would be useless to concentrate more forces upon the same line, because it is already difficult to engage so many troops upon the same day, and on the same field of battle. Moreover, I have not given an exclusive preference to central operations, since I have often represented those on an extremity of the enemy's line as more advantageous. Also a central line of operations opposed to two armies on the same front, such, for example, as that of the Archduke Charles against Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, is not to be confounded with a line of operations entirely surrounded by enemies; this last is much less favourable, and may become even dangerous when the hostile masses are numerous. Lastly, I will reply, that an army surrounded by the hostile array of Europe, an army composed of heterogeneous parts, famished by its own magnitude and harassed by swarms of light troops, such as had never yet been seen, could not, by the single fact of its central position, avoid the fate of Napoleon in Saxony. But one exception does not destroy a general rule; and in all ordinary wars, that power which, fighting with equal chances (*i. e.* with equal means), applies this

system, when its enemy follows a contrary one, must inevitably triumph. In proof of this, I appeal to the most distinguished generals of all armies and to the greatest exploits in the page of modern history."

"Those who deny the existence of the Science of War, in order to be excused from studying it, have objected, that no principles could be general, since the plan of the Marquis De Contades, so well combined in 1758, for the invasion of Westphalia and Hanover, produced nothing but reverses; an argument pitiful indeed, but which must nevertheless be answered.

"'It is doubtless of great importance, that the plan of a campaign be founded upon the first principles of war, since it is upon this that great results depend. Thus the concentric march of Napoleon on Gera in 1806, was a victory in itself, for it assured all the advantages of one. But what is the use of a good plan, based upon the general principles of war, when the *execution* of it is not in unison with them? or what would this fine march have effected, if the French army, having got upon the communications of the Prussians, had remained idle at Saalfield and Schleitz, until their enemies had recovered themselves by marching to Gera, between the Ulster and Mulda? Plans founded on grand principles, and executed according to them, produce memorable victories,

and decisive results; such were those of Napoleon, before he had been intoxicated by ten years of success; and such also were those of his enemies, when, enlightened by experience, they learnt to apply the principles which he had established.

"The battle of Waterloo is a fresh instance in favour of the application of these principles. Napoleon, having skilfully concentrated his forces, without the knowledge* of the English or Prussian generals, would have overwhelmed Blucher at Ligny, if the orders which he had given to his left division had been executed, and if the Count D'Erlon had debouched by Bry, as he ought to have done. In spite of the non-performance of these orders, he obtained a great victory on the 16th, but two days afterwards, he was defeated, because he had, in contempt of his enemy, ordered Grouchy to make a movement contrary to the first principles of war. The allies, leaving the marshal to amuse himself, debouched upon the rear of Napoleon by

* Not liking to alter the text of Jomini, where I translate from him, I leave this passage as I found it. The assertion of ignorance of Buonaparte's movement on the part of the English general is, however, unfounded. The truth is, that from the political nature of the war, the allies were obliged to act on the defensive, which left Buonaparte at liberty to concentrate his columns upon any of the roads into Flanders that he pleased, whilst the movements of the allies must be consequent upon, and subservient to his. Under such circumstances, victory was the more glorious to the defensive party.

one of the best combined and boldest of marches. If on the evening of the 17th, Napoleon ordered Grouchy to fall back upon him, as has been affirmed, he repaired his error, and his defeat was, in this case, the result of accident, which prevented the execution of this movement.

"A fondness for attributing every thing to genius or to chance, may induce others to cite some events in which success has been obtained in contrariety to the first principles of war. Their error arises from their confounding masses which were present only, with those which were active. It is not the troops, which are mustered in an army, nor those arrayed on the ground, which conquer, but those *only* which are *put in action*. All the operations of Frederick, of Napoleon, and of every great warrior, are proofs of this truth.

"Doubtless, genius has great share in success, because it presides in the application of the established rules, and seizes all the shades of variety of which they are susceptible; but *in no case* will the man of genius act against those rules. An unskilful general may obtain a victory in opposition to the first principles of the science; it happens so sometimes, for one of the two parties engaged must need gain it: but such an event proves nothing but reciprocal incapacity, and the total ignorance of tactics in the two chiefs. Such were the battles of the middle ages, in which the

qualities of the troops, and the bravery of the chiefs, were the ordinary causes of success."

It is the pride of an Englishman here to add, that never has more original or transcendant genius been displayed, in the application of these grand principles, than in their adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the combined British and Peninsular armies, in the campaigns of Spain and Portugal. From the allied forces being generally inferior in numbers to their enemy, there may arise an opinion, a flattering one too, to national vanity, that British strength, and British courage, can dispense with an adherence to military principles by English generals; but with every allowance for the excellence of the free-born soldiers of England, it must be acknowledged, on close inspection, that the grand principle of concentrated efforts upon decisive points has been the rule by which the Duke of Wellington has conquered. In the retreat upon the Torres Vedras, he yielded with scientific coolness to the action of an overwhelming mass, but he had previously rendered the decisive point, where lay the crisis of the contest, unattackable; at least we may presume so, when the French commander, remarkable for the boldness of his operations, preferred the certain ruin of a retreat to the possibility of crowning his successes by the conquest of this formidable barrier. The *scientific soldier* may

indeed be of opinion, that no position which is *approachable* is unattackable, and that Massena should rather have buried his army under the lines of Torres Vedras than in the ravaged plains and desolate mountains of Portugal or Spain. However, be this as it may; Wellington there awaited, with unconquerable fortitude, the destructive and disseminating effects of the famine, which soon preyed upon his adversaries. Perhaps there has been no similar instance, none at least so striking, since the Fabian defence of ancient Rome. The French commanders, whose constant success, and a glut of soldiers, had rendered careless of human life, had neglected those sage precautions for the support and comfort of their men, which these grand principles do not render less necessary, because they are not to be fettered by them; or indeed, as stated by Colonel Jones, the French had not sufficient military possession of the intermediate country, to establish a chain of depôts and supplies. "Whatever be the reason, the consequence," says Colonel Jones, "was that the French under Marmont and Soult, although, collectively, vastly superior in numbers to the allied forces, were obliged to canton so widely for the sake of drawing supplies from the exhausted country they occupied, that they could not immediately oppose a sufficient

mass to the more united efforts of the British and Portugueze, whom the sagacious arrangements of their commander, and the never-failing resources of an all-powerful navy, enabled to canton closer on the same frontier. Therefore it was, that at the very moment when Lord Wellington acknowledged his inferiority of force, by relinquishing the siege of Badajoz, when it was nearly within his grasp, he formed the design of wresting from the enemy the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which, from every feeling of honour and interest, that enemy was bound to preserve." "And therefore it is," in the proud language of this patriotic officer, "that the impartial historian, of whatever country he may be, is bound to record, that these brilliant triumphs over the French armies, viz. the capture of the above mentioned fortresses, were obtained by the Portugueze and British, when Buonaparte was in amity with all the world, and his military empire was in the zenith of its strength and glory."

Afterwards, in the campaign of 1813, the employment of the French forces in Russia, having produced nearly an equality of numbers between the hostile armies in Spain, "Lord Wellington," says the same historian, "disregarding all petty success and ephemeral triumphs, planned a series of grand manœuvres to force the French

back, and fix the contention at a point where a victory would affect every part of the country in their possession." This, it is well known, was effected by a flank march through the provinces of Tras os Montes along the left bank of the Douro, thereby rendering null the formidable preparations of the French on the right; and thus, by a succession of masterly manœuvres on their communications, almost without firing a shot, were the French obliged to abandon more than 150 miles of country, and to seek security behind the line of the Ebro, where at Vittoria the final blow was struck, and Spain made free.

It may be expected, in a work upon military principles written by an Englishman, that the strategy and tactics of our great commander would be oftener cited than they have been here; but, not only were they, from the peculiarities of his situation, of a very particular nature, but also I think that in the compilation of the opinions of any author, his own reasons and examples should be principally brought forward. Any man who is once acquainted with the first principles of war, will be both delighted and instructed by a comparison of them with the manœuvres for the defence of Portugal and the liberation of Spain, and particularly with that beautiful exhibition of the talents and resources of two great captains which followed in the Pyrenees and in France,

immediately on Marshal Soult's assuming the command of the French; all which is admirably displayed with the simplicity and fidelity of a soldier and an eye-witness by Colonel Jones in his History of the War.

CHAPTER VI.

UPON THE ART OF BRINGING WITH RAPIDITY CONCENTRATED FORCES UPON THE DECISIVE POINT OF A PRIMITIVE LINE OF OPERATIONS, OR OF AN ACCIDENTAL LINE.

The attentive consideration of the previous Chapters will, I hope, establish, First, that the decisive point of a theatre of war is that where the fate of the defending army and of the objects of its defence, is fixed; Secondly, that this must be situated where there is no retreat left for it, or, at any rate, none but what will carry it altogether away from the point to be defended; Thirdly, that the concentrated efforts of the assailants should be directed by marches either on the flanks of the line of defence, in case it be close and connected, or on the centre, if it be open and extended, to bring the contest as rapidly as possible to this decisive point; and Fourthly, that there, or no where, is the victory to be gained. I say, I hope these principles will be established, because that determined resolution, which marches fearlessly to its end, and which forms so leading a feature in the character of a great captain, can be reasonably

attained only by a full conception and thorough conviction of the truth of those general laws, by which the chances of war are decided; in the same manner as the confidence of a judicious gambler must depend upon the accuracy and rapidity with which he can perceive the probabilities of his game. It has also, I trust, been shown, that rapidity of execution is no less necessary than judicious combinations to the success of military operations. If the enemy be allowed time for recollection, the most ingenious attacks may be parried; but the art of war requires the utmost promptitude in seizing upon, and carrying to the greatest advantage, the unguarded movements of an enemy. To attain this rapidity of execution, and to operate with the utmost promptitude, a combined effort upon a decisive point, it is requisite to be the first in motion. The general who puts this advantage on his side, can employ his forces wherever he thinks fit to direct them. He, on the contrary, who waits for his enemy cannot be master of any combination, since he renders his movements subordinate to those of his adversary; and he has no longer the time to stop these, when they are already in full execution. The general who commences the attack, knows what he is going to do; he hides his march, surprises and overwhelms an extremity of his adversary's line, or any weak part; he who waits for

the attack, allows part of his army to be beaten before he knows of its being engaged.

It is undeniable, that the movements of that army which commences operations can be concealed until they are already in execution. By this means a general may gain many marches upon an enemy, in the movements he makes in the interior of his line of manœuvre. It is therefore of the first importance, in order to form a just idea of the science of war, and to judge correctly of military operations, to banish from our minds all those compassed calculations which are founded on the supposition that an enemy may be informed of a movement at the moment it is commenced, and may oppose it immediately by the most suitable counter-movement.

A general, commencing operations, should neglect no means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the positions and force of the enemy, and with the movements which may be in the power of that enemy. A system of espionage or secret service is a most useful means of information, to the perfection of which he cannot give too great care and attention; but it is even of more essential importance that he should feel his way by partizan corps; he ought to spread them in all directions, and multiply and scatter them with as much solicitude as he should concentrate and unite his regular forces in his grand operations. To operate

without these precautions,* is to work in the dark, and to expose one's self to the most disastrous consequences of a secret movement of the enemy.

It is unnecessary for a general, especially for one who commences with rapid offensive movements, to march his forces in a body, until they arrive at the point where they are to meet and fight the enemy. On the contrary, he should form his army according to its strength, into several grand-divisions, and direct them upon the communications which converge upon this important point. This general direction (as shown in Chapter IV.) can be given only upon the centre, upon one of the flanks, or upon the rear of the enemy's line. It is better in general to direct it upon a flank, from whence it is easy to get upon the rear. The direction upon the centre is proper, only when the adversary's line of defence is extended, and the corps composing it are separated by great intervals. In this case the greater number of divisions should march upon one of these isolated corps, and endeavour to crush it, whilst the other divisions hold the central point, and keep the remaining part of the enemy in check.

* "These precautions have been too much neglected; the system of espionage has not been sufficiently organized, and the officers of light troops have not always had the experience necessary to conduct their detachments."—*Note by the Baron de Jomini.*

When the greatest mass of force is directed upon the rear, in passing by one of the flanks of an army, it is necessary to leave a corps upon the flank to preserve the communication with one's own line of operation, whilst the adversary is cut off from his. This corps serves at the same time to attack in flank, and to prevent the enemy from leaving his disadvantageous position by a concealed movement. These operations are most favourable when the enemy is at a great distance from the base whence they proceed. The same principles can, nevertheless, be applied in positions which are much nearer to him, even at the distance of two marches. In this case it is necessary, that the several corps should not have more ground to traverse, in order to unite at the principal point, than there is distance between those corps and the advanced posts in front of the enemy.

By means of this system of strategy, an army commanding a greater extent of ground, and marching more rapidly than otherwise, may subsist on the country in which it moves. It will only be necessary that each corps be followed by the quantity of cattle and biscuit it will require, until it reach the enemy, and also for the few days it may be in closer position with other corps. This provision will be sufficient if it furnish subsistence until it can be renewed.

Whenever an enemy makes a wide movement in order to induce a general to divide his forces, he, instead of doing so, ought rapidly to unite his divisions, and make a vigorous attack upon the main body which has been thus weakened with the hope that he would imitate so bad an example. When two armies attempt to combine their operations, and to put their enemy between two fires, whilst they remain at a distance of several marches from each other, they form a double line of manœuvre, against a single one, and expose themselves to be beaten separately, if the enemy knows how to profit by his central position. This manœuvre is equally faulty with a wide flank movement, on a field of battle. Both of them may be classed as manœuvres of too great extension, and so may all movements, which do not produce a simultaneous effect at the moment of execution.

A defeated army should always be pursued with activity and spirit. The force of an army consists in its organization, in the connection of all its parts with the central authority which moves them. After a defeat, this connection ceases to exist. The harmony between the head which combines, and the corps which execute, is lost; their relations are suspended, and almost always broken; the whole army is a weak point: to attack it, is to march to victory.

CHAPTER VII.

UPON THE ART OF BRINGING WITH RAPIDITY CONCENTRATED FORCES UPON THE DECISIVE POINT OF A PRIMITIVE LINE OF OPERATIONS, OR OF AN ACCIDENTAL LINE.

I HAVE now sketched out the general principles by which the division and disposition of troops, and the direction of their marches, should be regulated, and have also stated some hints of a general nature for giving the greatest possible concealment and rapidity to their movements. To amplify and impress these hints, I shall continue my quotations from the Baron de Jomini. "The war of invasion," says this celebrated author, "is especially advantageous, when the seat of empire of the country attacked is entirely in the capital. Under the government of a great prince, and in ordinary wars, the seat of empire is at the head-quarters of the army;* but under a

* The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of Napoleon; but this circumstance does not destroy my assertion. Napoleon, without an army, had all Europe on his hands, whilst even the French nation had deserted his cause. With 50,000 men, he would have quickly shown that his capital was at his head-quarters.

De Jomini, vol iii

weak prince, and in a democratic state, and still more in a war of opinion, the capital is generally the centre of the national power. If this truth could ever have been doubted, it might have been established in 1793. The empire of France was so confined to Paris, that two-thirds of the nation had raised the standard of resistance to the government which oppressed it. Yet so compassed were the combinations of the allies, that after many victories, 200,000 men were employed for six months in sieges, without gaining one inch of ground! At the very moment at which they ought to have invaded France, they formed fifteen or sixteen corps, in defensive positions, in order to cover their own frontiers. One might imagine that one again beheld Prince Charles of Lorraine, who, in 1757, decided in a council of war, that he would not attack Breslau with 90,000 men, for fear the garrison of Schweidnitz, 6000 strong, should cut off his retreat."

The age for such combinations has probably passed away for ever; but this only renders more necessary that quickness of intellect, that coup d'œil, which seizes at once upon all the relations even of the most intricate subjects, and determines immediately upon the preferable line of conduct. The rapidity with which military combinations are now executed, renders hesitation, and all the vices of ordinary minds, more than ever ruinous.

Those who advocate the transcendency of genius, will be fully gratified by this truth. To prevent, however, such prompt decisions degenerating into blind rashness, all the talents of a commander must be turned to the procuring of information of the movements and even intentions of the enemy. The immense advantages which the Cossacks have given to the Russian armies are a proof of the truth of this article. These light troops, although insignificant in the shock of a great battle, are terrible in the pursuit. They are the most redoubtable enemy possible to the combinations of a general, because he can never be sure of the arrival or execution of his orders. His convoys are always compromised and his operations uncertain. Whilst no more than a few regiments of them were attached to an army their whole value could not be known; but since their numbers have been carried to 15 or 20,000 men, their importance has been felt, especially in countries where the population is not hostile to them. If but one convoy be carried off by them, it then becomes necessary, that all the rest should for the future be escorted, and moreover, that the escorts should be numerous and well conducted. One can never be certain of making a quiet march, because one never knows where to expect the enemy. These swarms must be opposed by immense forces, and the regular

cavalry is soon worn out by fatigues beyond its powers. The Turkish militia produce nearly the same effects on the Russians, that the Cossacks do on the other European armies. Convoys are not safer in Bulgaria, than they have been in Spain or Poland. I think that in other armies, some thousands of Hussars and Lancer volunteers, raised at the commencement of a war, well commanded, and flying in all directions at the option of bold and adventurous chiefs, might answer nearly the same end. These chiefs must always be left to their own discretion, for, from the moment that they receive orders from the general staff, that moment they cease to be partizans. It is true that these light troops would not equal good Cossacks, nor would they be able to struggle with them in the long run; but still, every possible remedy should be applied to an evil which is inevitable.

The advantage of prompt and fearless decision, particularly in the execution of rapid concentration, in opposition to extended movements, is shown by De Jomini in his account of the conduct of Buonaparte at Mantua. "Outflanked on his left; attacked on his rear, almost surrounded by superior forces; having only a small space of ground to manœuvre upon, and being liable to be harassed by a numerous garrison; he abandoned every thing, even his battering train, in order to

strike the decisive blow. This operation, with the battles of Lonato and Castiglione, are models for generals of future ages to imitate."

This general was no less famous for the incessant activity with which he pressed upon a defeated, or even worsted enemy. Of this he gave examples in his march upon Roveredo and the vallies of La Brenta, to complete the ruin of Wurmser; in that one from Ulm upon Vienna; in that from Jena upon Wittemberg, Custrin, and Stettin. He was imitated in this by the activity and perseverance with which the Russian army pursued its successes in 1812 and 1814. Ordinary generals often neglect the pursuit of their enemy. It seems as if all the efforts of their genius, and the extent of their ambition, were limited to gaining the field of battle. Such a victory is but a displacing of the troops without any real utility.

CHAPTER VIII.

UPON THE COMBINATIONS REQUISITE TO COVER A SIEGE.

In the present system of what is called the War of Vigour, in opposition to the old one called the War of Position, fortresses have little influence upon the events of a campaign. It has been found that the isolated bodies of men inclosed within their walls cannot seriously affect the movements of masses, ten, twenty, or even thirty times their number; and since the fate of war is now decided by justice of combination, and rapidity of execution, it is customary to mask these places with a sufficient number of men, to protect the communications of the army from the incursions of their garrisons, and to leave their lot to be decided by the operations in the field. There are, however, occasions when the possession of a fortress may be necessary as a base of operations, and a depôt for the grand magazines of the army, or when it may be desirable as depriving the enemy of his last hold in a country; and on such occasions it will

be well to be thoroughly acquainted with the combinations best calculated to protect the siege.

An army which covers a siege ought never to allow itself to be attacked by the enemy. It is necessary to be beforehand with him. A general is most likely to reduce a fortress by defeating the army to relieve it, and he has more chance of success by attacking, than by remaining quietly in position.

If the enemy present an imposing force, he should raise the siege, unite his army, and attack him, according to the rules for the art of combats, by making a concentrated and overwhelming effort on an extremity of his line. Supposing that he defeats the army of relief, then he can always resume the blockade or siege, and also pursue the beaten army until it be out of condition to return before the place surrenders.

When a general undertakes a siege in consequence of offensive movements and of successful operations, he ought not to cover it by taking up a neighbouring position, but he should pursue his adversary as far as possible. In fact, the greater distance there is to traverse in order to succour a fortress, the more time will it require; and the more difficult will it be to relieve it; the covering army, by defending the intermediate ground inch by inch, will give the besiegers sufficient time to take the place. If, however, the enemy should

approach near enough to make the success of his enterprize doubtful, then the general can raise the siege, unite the troops that formed it, to the covering army, and thus make a final effort. An example of this nature was furnished by Buonaparte at Mantua.

CHAPTER IX.

UPON THE SUBSISTENCE OF AN ARMY IN MARCH.

An army which is in march to strike a decisive blow can always find resources in the country through which it moves, sufficient at least to subsist it during the time of moving. It can therefore dispense, in proportion to these resources, with the equipage for the transport of provisions, &c. As it may, nevertheless, happen, that this army may be some days in position, it will be proper that it should be followed by an allowance of biscuits and cattle sufficient for seven or eight days, so as to assure at least what subsistence is strictly necessary, until a regular supply can be procured. To obtain such a supply, as fast as the country is occupied, requisitions should be made for all the disposable grain, in order that depôts may be formed, covered by the army.*

The number of these depôts ought to augment

* "These requisitions should be made through the legal authorities of the country, to be, of course, supported by troops to see them put into execution. Magazines may also be formed by contracts with the government of the country, and by convoys from one's own territory. Cattle, rice and biscuits are the safest provisions, and the most easy of transport."—*De Jomini.*

in proportion as the army advances. If, according to calculations founded upon an accurate knowledge of the culture and produce of the provinces to be traversed, only a momentary subsistence can be drawn from them, still it will be sufficiently considerable to support an army for one month, and this time is generally sufficient to decide the fate of an enterprize. In fifteen days, an army can traverse a line of 100 French leagues. This length, together with the distance on either side of an army to which it can command the country, gives a space of 500 leagues. In so vast an extent of country, sufficient nourishment may easily be found for 100,000 men. In the interval between the battle of Eylau and the peace of Tilsit, Napoleon subsisted 120,000 men for four months, in a country already ravaged. When the principal and decisive operation is concluded, then magazines and regular distributions can be organized to facilitate ulterior enterprizes.

CHAPTER X.

THE ART OF COMBATS, OR OF COMBINING THE SIMULTANEOUS ACTION OF THE GREAT MASS OF AN ARMY, UPON THE DECISIVE POINT OF A FIELD OF BATTLE.

I HAVE now given a general view of those considerations by which the positions and marches of armies should be regulated. I have endeavoured to show their immediate and natural connection with the postulate in the Introduction, that the combined action of superior numbers on a given point must prevail. The general position of this decisive point in the theatre of war I have also described: it must be on the centre or the flanks of the defensive line, according as the parts of this line be extended and unconnected, or close and capable of mutual support. This point must be attacked with overwhelming numbers and with unyielding obstinacy; and the defending army must be rapidly driven back in a direction divergent from the objects of its defence, upon an impassable barrier, where its dispersion and total disorganization must be the consequences of its defeat. I have also shown the nature of those

combinations by which this action of overwhelming numbers on a weak and exposed point is to be procured. These are the general principles by which we should judge of the operations of war, and with a view to which we should examine the conduct of generals under every variation of ground, political situation, and military force.

There remains but one other branch of the subject to be treated of, and this is the Art of Combats, or of combining the simultaneous action of the great mass of an army upon the decisive point of a field of battle.

All the combinations of a battle can be reduced to three systems.

The first, which is entirely defensive, consists in waiting for the attack of the enemy in a strong position, without any other object than that of maintaining it. Those who are acquainted with military history may be reminded, that such were the dispositions of Count Daun at Torgau, and of Marsin in the lines of Turin. These two instances are sufficient to show the exceeding visciousness of this system. The second, on the contrary, is entirely offensive: it consists in attacking the enemy wherever he can be found; as Frederick did at Leuthen and Torgau, Napoleon at Jena and Ratisbon, and the allies at Leipsic.

The third system is in some sort a middle term

between the other two. It consists in choosing a field of battle which has all the advantage of a good strategic position; i. e. of a good position, relatively to the line of operation; and which is also favourable from the nature of the ground, in order to await there the attack of the enemy, and to choose, during the battle, the convenient opportunity for acting on the offensive, and falling upon the enemy with every chance of success. The combinations of Napoleon at Rivoli and Austerlitz, and those of Wellington at Waterloo, and most of his defensive battles in Spain, are to be ranged in this class.

It would be difficult to give fixed rules to determine the employment of the two last systems, the only ones about which there can be any question. Regard must be had to the feelings of the troops on either side; to the national character, whether more or less phlegmatic or impetuous; lastly, to the difficulties of the ground. These circumstances alone can guide the genius of a general; and these may be reduced to the three following positions:

First, that with veteran troops, and on ordinary ground, the absolutely offensive, or the initiative of attack, is always the best.

Secondly, that in ground which is difficult of access, whether naturally or otherwise, and with disciplined and submissive troops, it is perhaps

more convenient to let the enemy attack a position, which one has previously reconnoitred, in order afterwards to commence on the offensive against him, when his troops are exhausted by their first efforts.

Thirdly, that the strategic situation of these two parties may, nevertheless, render it necessary to carry the position of one's adversary by main force, without stopping at any local consideration; for instance, when necessary to prevent the junction of two hostile armies, or to fall upon a detachment from an army, or upon a corps isolated by the intervention of a river, &c.

Having premised so much on the general combinations of a battle, I go on to speak of the direction to be given to the attacks, and of the general considerations relative to them. As in every line of defensive position, so in every line of battle, there is a point, the firm possession of which decides the victory. This point may be called the key of the position, and can be only in one of three situations; the extremities and centre of the line.

The direction of attacks is then limited to these three points. The attack upon the centre is the best, when the enemy's line is much extended, and his wings cannot be easily brought up to its support; but, in general, it is better to attack one of the flanks, as being less easily assisted from the centre or the other flank.

If the enemy's army be posted at right angles to a river, or any other great obstacle, with one of its flanks resting on it, the attack should be made with an overwhelming force on the opposite flank, in order to crush it back on the centre, and finally to throw the whole army in rout on the obstacle, when it must either surrender, or run the risk of being annihilated. An attack upon the flank resting upon the obstacle, would, on the contrary, put the chances of success in favour of the enemy, by enabling him by a change of front towards the obstacle, to concentrate his forces on the outward flank of the attacking army, which, thus enclosed, would be inevitably ruined. It is wrong to attack both flanks at the same time, unless with forces extremely superior on both points, and also acting at the same moment. Multiplied attacks, by many columns, especially when conducted on distinct points, are still worse, still more opposed to the fundamental principles of the art of war, and are indeed of the same nature in tactics as multiplied lines of operation in strategy.

Although it be an established maxim that an army which attacks another, either of superior or of equal force to itself, cannot do so with any assurance of success but by a concentrated effort, either upon a single point of a weakened line, or upon an extremity of the line which cannot be

quickly supported, yet an army, attacking another *very inferior* to it in force, ought, on the contrary, to form two or three divisions, so as to put all its masses into action against weaker ones; for if it confined itself to exertion on a single principal point, the whole of its forces could not be employed, whilst the whole of the enemy's army, being concentrated on it, would restore the balance of the contest, and perhaps enable him to maintain his position. It is, however, indispensably necessary that the action of these divisions be combined on the same ground and at the same instant, in order to produce that union and cooperation, without which the army would risk being defeated partially and in detail.

It is to be understood, that this last maxim is particularly applicable to battles, and not to strategic operations, for in these it is not necessary that corps, acting at a distance of several marches, should engage at the same moment; and it would be impossible that they should do so on the same ground, but if the principle is not applicable to both cases, it is not the less true with regard to battles.

As in each front of operations and in each line of battle, there exists, nevertheless, a decisive point, it is important, even when attacking on all points with superior numbers, to distribute the forces in such manner, as that, independently of

the superiority they must every where have over the enemy, the corps destined to act on this point should be supported by a good reserve. Still, however, in all cases where there is not an overwhelming preponderance of force, a concentrated effort upon one flank may be said to be, generally, the most advantageous method of attack. It, therefore, becomes indispensable to gain this flank by concealed movements, otherwise the enemy would be able to follow the march of the columns which attempt to outflank him, and would either make front against them or attack the heads of them whilst in march. In this case, being driven back on their rear by a superior force attacking them in front, they would be in as bad a position as an army attacked in flank. Flank movements may be concealed under favour of the obscurity of the atmosphere, or of the risings of the ground, or of a false attack upon the front of the enemy. The two last are the best means of concealment, especially when they can be united, because marches in the dark are less certain and less regular than those in the light. A general, commanding an army which is highly disciplined, ought, as often as possible, to attack his enemy when in march, even though this last should be much superior to him in number. If, in general, an army of equal force with its enemy must place its chief hope of success in being beforehand with

him, and attacking with concentrated and superior forces the decisive point of his position, much more should an army of inferior force, when a battle is foreseen, take the lead of its enemy, and follow the fine examples of Frederick, at Rosbach and Leuthen. It is also to be remarked, that a front attack is always useless when a concentrated effort can be made on the extremity of a line: in this case simple demonstrations on the front are sufficient.

When an army occupies a camp upon heights or any other ground suitable for a field of battle, it ought to observe very narrowly the ground in its front and on its flanks, in order to prevent the enemy's *outflanking it by a concealed movement. It being allowed that a division into numerous corps, uselessly disseminates one's forces, without affording any security against a surprise, it will be well to place in favourable positions, small independent posts of observation, which can communicate with each other, as well as with the army and intermediate corps.

* In order to prevent mistakes, it must here be mentioned, that by outflanking I do not mean a mere extension of the line of an army beyond that of its enemy in a parallel direction; this is not an attack, but a demonstration, and generally a very bad one, as it weakens the centre; but I mean the formation of the main body of the army on one flank of the enemy, and in a transverse direction to this line. This was the manœuvre of Frederick at Leuthen.

A battle should never be fought but when a great advantage is to result from it, or when the position of the armies renders it necessary. If the enemy should be very advantageously placed, it is a good method of drawing him from his position by attacking him with some battalions, who should retire afterwards in disorder behind some troops destined to support them.

After all, in order to operate well in war, it is not sufficient skilfully to direct the mass of one's forces upon the most important points; it is also necessary to know how to engage them when there. He who remains inactive, when established on these points, forgets the principles of war, and puts it in the enemy's power to make counter manœuvres. To prevent this, it is necessary, as soon as his communications or one of his extremities have been gained, to meet and fight him. It is then particularly requisite to combine the simultaneous employment of one's forces. It is not the masses which are present, but those which are acting, that decide battles. Those which are present decide in the preparatory movements of strategy. Those which are acting, determine the issue of the contest. In order to make this successful, a skilful general should seize the opportunity of carrying the decisive position of the field of battle, and he ought so to combine

his attack as to engage all his troops at the same time, with the exception only of the reserve.

When an effort, founded on such principles, fails to obtain victory, one cannot expect it from any combination, and nothing remains to be done, but to strike a last blow with the reserve, in concert with the troops already engaged.

The success of an affair generally depends upon the first attack, particularly in the passage of a river, and in all operations in which the troops cannot be brought into action but in succession. When the first columns that cross a bridge or a ravine can form and maintain themselves until supported by the army, the success of the enterprize is certain. It may thence be inferred, that in the defence it is essential to prevent the formation of the leading columns. They must be rushed upon without the slightest hesitation; the least demur would lose every thing. The attack, once resolved upon must be made with vigour and promptitude, for if it be repulsed, there is nothing to hope from a second attempt.

CHAPTER XI.

UPON THE ORDERS OF ATTACK.

There are but three orders, or general modes of attack; the parallel, the oblique, and the perpendicular. Each of these orders is compatible with a concentrated effort on one flank of the enemy's line, but the two last are the most advantageous. An army B may be in parallel order to the army A, and yet have one of its wings reinforced for attack, the other being intended to be refused or held back, merely to keep the opposite wing of the enemy in check, as in figure 1, Plate IV.

An army D may be formed in oblique order, upon the hostile army C, without being reinforced on either wing, and making an oblique angle at the flank to be attacked, as in figure 2, Plate IV.

Lastly, an army F may be reinforced on the point of attack, and formed in perpendicular order to the flank of the enemy E, if he be in line of battle, or to the heads of his columns, if he be in march, as in figure 3, Plate IV.

The advantages of the oblique and perpendicular orders of attack are, that by the advance of the line of attack, the enemy's line, if he be in position, or his columns if in march, are continu-

ally crowded back, in the first instance upon the opposite flank; in the last upon the rear of the columns, without having either time or room for formation. The advance of the line of attack must always be so conducted as to prevent the enemy's forming on its flank. To this purpose it should prolong itself horizontally, so as to continually outflank and repress the enemy upon his centre and opposite flank, or upon his rear, according to whether he be in position or march. This may be explained by figure 4, Plate IV.

A B, F G, the enemy in position or in march by his left. C D, the order of attack either oblique or perpendicular upon the flank or heads of columns at B and G. G F, E D, the direction of the attack. E E, the line of attack advanced.

It is evident that a third of the army, A B, F G, may be put to the rout before it can be supported by the remainder, and that the advance of E E must overwhelm the whole successively. A reinforced attack may be made on the flank of an army by means of a crotchet perpendicular to it, the main body of the attack being in parallel order.

The crotchet A, figure 5, Plate IV. reinforces the attack of the line B, although it be in parallel order to the enemy C. The disadvantage of the parallel order of attack is that the refused wing is, from its proximity to the enemy, liable to be engaged and defeated, which might balance the

successes gained by the wing reinforced for attack. Also, that the original direction of the attack leads to nothing beyond the repulse of the troops opposed to it, and a turn at right angles must be made to bring it upon that wing of the enemy which is yet untouched, and which in the mean time may manœuvre, so as at any rate to get away.

CHAPTER XII.

UPON THE USE OF THE CROTCHET.

When the contending armies are equally skilled in manœuvring, a crotchet, or line en potence, as it is sometimes called, may be formed with success against attacks in flank. To assure the success of this manœuvre, it is not sufficient merely to form a crotchet. This formation only meets the danger of the moment, but the army must change front in the same direction, so as to oppose its whole line to the enemy and to repulse him. If the army which is attacked be sufficiently strong to act offensively against its adversary, instead of making this change of front, which is only a defensive manœuvre, it should first rapidly form a crotchet to keep the front of the enemy in check, and to protect its menaced flank; then the rest of the line should make a flank movement, by a column of platoons or divisions, and prolong itself in the direction of the position it occupied, so as to fall in its turn upon the flank of the army which is endeavouring to attack it.

It is to be remarked, that a crotchet in advance of the line does not cover the flank of an army so well as one in the rear, and that an army which remains

immoveable in any position, however strong, may always be overwhelmed on a flank; and the only method of opposing an attack successfully, is to manœuvre in the same sense as the enemy, and by seizing the opportunity to attack his line.

CHAPTER XIII.

UPON THE DISPOSITION OF TROOPS ON THE GROUND.

It is not the troops which are carried on the muster-rolls of an army, nor those which are paraded on the ground, which gain victories, but those only which are brought into action; those which are not, can only embarrass and be in the way.

For this reason an army which is much superior in number to its enemy, should never bring more men into line than he does, perhaps it should deploy fewer; the remainder should be formed in columns, ready to strike decisive blows or to manœuvre on the flanks, and carry the key of the enemy's position. An army when deployed, is no longer moveable as when in column; and to render immoveable the forces which are not engaged, is to commit a serious fault against every principle.

A general who, by the rapidity of his motions, or by the skill of his manœuvres, can bring into action at the same instant, and on the same principal point more men than his adversary, ought necessarily to obtain the victory, provided the troops on either side be equal in valour.

To make such a concentrated effort upon a single

point, it is important that the troops for attack should be disposed in a space nearly square, in order that they may be as moveable and as solid as possible: they should be drawn up in two lines of battalions, exclusive of the reserve. Each battalion, instead of being deployed, should be formed in columns of divisions, as in the manner exhibited in fig. 6. Plate IV.

A division is composed of two platoons, and the battalions, of six platoons, or companies.

This disposition applies to the troops for the attack, those for the defence may be partly in line, and partly in column.

In ground which is difficult of access, such as vineyards, enclosures, gardens, and heights surrounded by ravines, the battalions for defence should be drawn up in two ranks, and covered by numerous platoons of skirmishers; but the party for attack, as well as for reserve, cannot be better disposed, than in columns of attack, by the centre, as pointed out above. The reserve, which should be ready to fall upon the enemy, ought to do so with force and spirit, and this is most attainable by an attack in columns.

A part of it may nevertheless be left deployed, until the moment it is to charge the enemy, in order that its extent may impose upon him. An army posted behind villages should cover its front with them; for this purpose they should be

guarded by some battalions and artillery. The line should be sufficiently near to support the villages, and to be supported by them in return; and also to withdraw the troops which occupy them, in case the success of the enemy on another point should endanger their escape. The liability of these posts to be turned and the nature of their defence requires that one should not place too many infantry in them, nor attach too much value to their preservation.

The same maxim is applicable to an army covered by redoubts, or other detached field-works.

Cavalry should never be altogether drawn up in line. Every line in rear of the first suffers equally with it from the fire of artillery, and also from the consequence of its rout if it be defeated, in which case the lines in the rear cannot be brought into action.* The divisions of cavalry should be posted in columns of squadrons, and according to the ground. Then, if it be desirable to attack the flank of the enemy, the reserve, formed in columns of squadrons behind the first line, may prolong itself on the flank of the enemy's line, taking open distance whilst advancing, and then forming line of battle by merely wheeling

* The disadvantages of this formation are evident from the dispositions of the Austrian cavalry in the battle of Prague.

upon the right or left of squadrons, it will charge the enemy immediately in flank and reverse.

When an important charge of cavalry is to be made along the skirts of a wood, or other cover, it ought to be immediately preceded by a vigorous attack of infantry upon these obstacles. If there be reason to presume that the enemy does not occupy them in force, it will be sufficient to clear them out by two or three battalions.

If you have disposable infantry, you should occupy these covers and put some artillery in position there to second the charge of cavalry, and to ensure their success.

If cavalry be placed on the defensive, near a wood, it is indispensable to place infantry in it, in order to prevent the enemy from making this manœuvre.

This is not applicable to the charge of an advance guard, or of light cavalry in pursuit of an enemy, or to those decisive charges in a battle, intended to prevent, or suspend, a movement of the adversary, but to the attack of an enemy's line which enters into the original combinations of a battle.

CHAPTER XIV.

UPON THE ART OF COMBATS.

PRECEPT is best explained and enforced by example. I have undertaken this compilation of the general principles of military science, under the impression that the greater part of these evidently and necessarily follow the admission of the position advanced by the Baron De Jomini, and which, as a general truth, is not likely, I think, to be disputed by experienced soldiers, viz. that the action of the greatest number of men on a point of decisive importance, often called the key of the position, must obtain victory. The Baron has deduced these principles separately from a mass of historical facts, and brought them, with the whole weight of experiment by which he has supported them, to the establishment of this primary and universal truth, with which truth they are all necessarily connected. I, for the sake of brevity, and clearness of exposition, have taken a different method, and assuming his theorem as true, have presented it as the base of a regular system of military philosophy, by which all operations should be judged. How far I have succeeded, the public will decide; but I think it right,

in a work intended only as an introduction to the Science of War, to cite some examples which may not only enforce these principles, but also lead to a more critical and extended study of military history. It has been stated in Chapter X. that it is wrong to attack both flanks of an army at the same time, excepting with very superior forces. This is a natural consequence of the postulate I have throughout insisted upon: for, excepting with very superior forces indeed, it would be impossible to establish an overwhelming force upon the principal point of a position, and upon any secondary one at the same time, and therefore a decisive victory is not to be expected as the result of such a combination. As I have in the preface mentioned General Blake, as a warning against the neglect of military philosophy, I will bring forward his conduct in attestation of the maxim just advanced. The following is from Colonel Jones's History of the War in Spain, Portugal, and France. "Blake commanded the army of Valencia in 1811. His force amounted to 30, or 35,000 men, being nearly all the veteran troops in Spain, including the corps which fought so gallantly at Albuera. The different corps and divisions were commanded by Zayas, Lardizabal, C. O'Donnel, Villa Campa, Juan Caro, Mahy, officers of distinguished merit; and the cavalry and horse-artillery were of superior quality.

Thus supported, Blake boldly advanced on the 25th October to relieve Murviedro; on his approach, Marshal Suchet, leaving six battalions to continue the blockade, took a position with his left resting on the sea, in rear of Puzol, and his right extending to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus; two brigades were allotted to observe the defile which leads from Betara to Gillet; with a brigade a little distance on their right, to watch the road from Segorbe, and a third in reserve to support either the blockading corps, or the left of the French line.

"The Spanish troops commenced the action with great spirit, rapidly driving back the French piquets, and making themselves masters of Puzol with scarce any loss; on their left also, after some hard fighting, they carried an important height, and captured two brigades of artillery. The battle then became general along the whole front, and being in view of the battlements of Murviedro, every advance of the Spaniards drew forth the most extravagant demonstrations of joy from the garrison. Already had some Spanish dragoons arrived within a mile and half of the place, and its relief seemed probable, when Blake, elated with the prospect of a victory, ordered a wide movement on both flanks to prevent the retreat of the French; of which Suchet took advantage to draw together all his reserves, and to attack

with a compact body the weakened centre of the Spaniards. He easily overpowered it, and drove it beyond Albalate; after which the circumventing wings being attacked with vigour on the heights of Peuch, and in the defiles of Batara, with difficulty escaped the fate they were preparing for their enemies; by force of marching, however, they effected their retreat, with the fugitives of the centre, and the army re-crossed the Guadalquivir with the loss of 2000 men in killed and wounded, and about 4000 made prisoners; the French loss being only 128 killed, and 596 wounded. Suchet's force must have been under 25,000 men."

How different might have been the fate of this fine army, had it attacked the French right, with concentrated forces; leaving a small detachment to make demonstrations on the front, in order to mask its movements! The French, thus crushed back into the sea, would have had to repent their awaiting an attack in such a position.

The advantages of the perpendicular and oblique orders of attack are also founded on the truth of that principle which I have made the base of my system. As examples of them, there can be none preferable to the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen, fought by the King of Prussia in the Seven Years' war. The first took place on the banks of the Saale, in the neighbourhood of Leip-

sic, in the year 1758. The combatants were the allied French and German armies, 50,000 strong, under the Prince de Soubise and Marshal the Duke de Richelieu, and the Prussians 25,000 strong, under their king. The following is the narrative, as related by the Baron De Jomini.* "The king, not thinking it prudent to put his troops into winter-quarters, whilst the enemy was in considerable force upon the frontiers of Magdeburgh, and Saxory, determined to give battle to the combined army, or, in case of refusal, to constrain it to retrograde so far, as not to trouble him for the rest of the campaign. Frederick threw bridges over the Saale at Weissenfels, Mersebourg, and Halle, and crossed his army over it in three columns, which re-united on the 2d November. The enemy, having abandoned the defence of the river, left Mersebourg, and collected all their forces. The king reconnoitred their position on the 3d, and resolved to attack them the next day. He then advanced at the head of his cavalry, in order to take up the most important positions for covering his infantry, and giving him time to make his dispositions for the attack. When arrived at Schortau, he perceived that the enemy had changed his position during the night: in consequence, he gave orders that

* See Plates V. and VI.

the army should march by its left, and encamp, the left at Rosbach, the centre behind Schortau, the right towards Bedra, and the cavalry in a third line, according to the order of battle annexed.

"The chiefs of the combined army, attributing the retrograde movement of the king to fear, felt their courage revive; and trusting to their great superiority in numbers, determined upon attacking him the next day, and thus finishing a campaign, the fatigue of which they did not seem formed to bear. The right and centre of the Prussians were too strongly posted to give any hopes of success in those quarters; they therefore resolved to attack his left wing, both in flank and reverse. The Count de St. Germain was detached with a considerable force to amuse the enemy, and protect the march of the army.

"At eleven o'clock he marched his division in three columns; the German cavalry forming the advance guard, the infantry following, and the French cavalry closing the march. When arrived at the flat on the left flank of the enemy, the army halted, and the French cavalry joined that in front. About two o'clock, the king perceived that the combined army had passed his flank, and was continuing its movements towards Mersebourg. He immediately ordered Seidlitz to march with the cavalry by divisions, to the

left in rear of the heights, and to post it upon that which is situated between Lundstedt and Reichertswerben. In the mean time, the infantry was to follow in haste. The generals of the combined army, seeing the enemy quit his camp with something like precipitation, and not being able to guess his intention, imagined that he was retiring. Fearing that the flight of the king might make them lose the fruit of their fine dispositions, they advanced rapidly with the cavalry, leaving the infantry far in the rear, under the impression that they should overtake and destroy the rear-guard, or force Frederick to a general action. Debouching near Reichertswerben, they saw the Prussian cavalry upon the heights behind this village, and continued to advance, presuming that it was posted merely to gain time and protect the retreat. They were soon undeceived: Seidlitz, marching with his forty-three squadrons behind the hills of Janus, suddenly arrived at the point J, formed two lines by simply wheeling up the squadrons, placed his artillery on the knoll, and charging the heads of the enemy's columns immediately, he threw them back upon Busendorf.

"The combined troops endeavoured to deploy upon the heads of their columns, but in vain, because Seidlitz was already established on their front and rear. The regiments de Pretlach and

de Travtsmansdorf nevertheless deployed in tolerable order, but were soon overthrown, and driven back with the rest of the cavalry upon their infantry across Roichertswerben, and Busendorf. During this charge, six Prussian battalions formed successively on their rear, and with Prince Henry at their head, marched to the support of Seidlitz, who was preparing to follow up his first attack, and was obliquing to the left, so as to turn more completely the enemy's columns,

"However the Prince de Soubise did not consider the affair lost; he therefore ordered up the reserve of five regiments of cavalry, to support the infantry and cover its deployment. This reserve was immediately charged and overthrown Then the French infantry, its flank exposed to that of the enemy, and suffering from a severe fire of artillery and musketry, found itself unable to hold its position, or to form upon the heads of the columns; it therefore retired, and endeavoured to deploy on the rear of the columns between the village of Busendorf, and that of Lutschiff, covered by a mass of French cavalry: but the latter being obliged to retire, the infantry abandoned the field of battle with precipitation. The Count de St. Germain protected the retreat. Such was the battle of Rosbach, in which 22,000 men, conducted with vigour and prudence, defeated more than 50,000, without other loss than

300 killed or wounded. The combined army had 800 killed, 6000 prisoners, and lost 72 pieces of cannon. The Prussian army encamped in the position R, its head-quarters at Burgwerben.

"The simplicity of the king's dispositions for the attacks of Rosbach, Kollin, and Leuthen, and the nature of his order of march in these and in other battles, afford many striking subjects for reflexion. In his orders of march may perhaps be found one of the chief causes of the great facility with which he moved large bodies of men, and carried them with rapidity upon an extremity of the enemy's line, with which he broke them into columns, or formed them into line, as instantaneously as lightning. It may also be considered as one which contributed much to the successes of Frederick.

"At one glance it may be seen that the Prussian army, at the battles of Kollin, Rosbach, and Leuthen, marched in columns of platoons, or divisions of regiments; the right or left flank in front; each line forming a column; it broke from line into this order, by wheeling on the right or left of platoons, and reformed line by simply wheeling up again.

"The following advantages result from this manœuvre.

"In the first place, the army is united in all its

movements; it runs no risk of being beaten in detail, because it forms but two columns, distant from each other the space of the first line from the second.

"In the second place, the enemy cannot penetrate between these columns to separate them.

"In the third, by marching in the direction in which the line of battle is to be formed, the army, when arrived on the ground, can form line in a few minutes, the time required for wheeling up the platoons. Not that this can be done exactly at the same moment, through the whole extent of the line, but the signal being given, there will be very small intervals in the time of execution by the different brigades, and certainly the formation will not occupy ten minutes. It will be necessary to protect the march of the columns by an advance guard, which will answer the double purpose of covering them, and deceiving the enemy.

"In the fourth place, as there should not be more than 200 or 300 paces between the columns which are to form the two lines, this manœuvre will be exact and precise.

"In the fifth, the army having arrived on the flank of the enemy by a concealed march, and then formed with rapidity, will not give him time to form a crotchet, or to change front. He will then be successively overpowered on an extremity

of his line; as were the Imperialists at the battle of Leuthen.

"In the sixth, if it be not desirable to form the army into two columns of a depth equal to the length of its line of battle, it may be formed into four, according to the ground, by doubling the line, or, in other words, by marching by wings; and this may be done, without augmenting the difficulty of its formation. These four columns, being formed by double lines, can undouble when arrived near the point of formation. The second halts, and protects the march of the first, until the rear of the first column passes the head of the second, when the second follows. In the same manner the fourth column closes up in rear of the third, when the whole again forms two columns ready to wheel into line as before.

"If the four lines are formed by wings, they can be thrown into two, by simply changing the direction of the advance and rear of columns at the same moment. The order of march at Leuthen shows this clearly. It is always however to be understood, that these orders of march are applicable only to an open field of battle, for, in countries much intersected, these great movements are impracticable. There, one must march by the common approaches, and be content to fight in columns.

"The system of keeping an army always united,

of presenting a mass to isolated parts, an entire line to a single extremity, these combinations so justly admired by the professors of the science of war, can be executed only by such orders of march, and by a mode of formation which unites promptitude, union, and simplicity. This system is founded on an order of combat in lines. It has been already shown that a line of battalions formed in close columns of divisions, at half distance of sections, is preferable. Each battalion having three divisions, it is in fact a formation in three lines, but the regiments, instead of being deployed, are three divisions in front, and three deep, and consequently more concentrated, more moveable and stronger; besides this order is not incompatible with a march by lines. This manner of marching, so convenient at the time when armies remained in presence of each other in extended camps, the approaches to which they had leisure to become acquainted with, and still convenient as a manœuvre on a field of battle, has lost much of its importance from the manner in which war is made at present. It must not be confounded with the profound combinations of strategy, or with the movements necessary to their execution. At present it is well understood that the march of an army in continued lines, by wings or lines, as recommended by Frederick, is without doubt one of the best when an army is advancing to the attack of an enemy: then, it is

considered a good manœuvre, but it is very useless and embarrassing when at sixty leagues from an enemy, when no great hostile force is assembled, and when there are many roads conducting concentrically to the point to be occupied. It is evident that five corps of 20,000 men each, can march much more rapidly upon any point by five different roads, than an army of 100,000 men by one; especially when it is followed by all the equipage for provision. Celerity of motion, which multiplies the force of an army, by carrying its mass alternately on all points of its line of operation, is an inestimable advantage in war; but it is not the only one offered by the modern system: there are two others, which have been pointed out; that of facilitating subsistence, and that of dividing the attention of the enemy."

It has been said in the 10th Chapter, that a general commanding an army which is highly disciplined, i. e. well trained and instructed in manœuvres, ought, as often as possible, to attack his enemy when in march, even though this last should be much superior to him in number. "The changes," says Jomini, "which have taken place in the art of war, and in the organization of armies, will certainly render the attack of armies on their march of much more rare occurrence than formerly. However, although the organization by divisions and corps d'armée seems much more proper to

stop a movement directed upon the head of a column, it is not the less true that the battle of Auerstedt was lost by the Prussians, and those of Marengo, Eylau, and Lutzen, nearly so, by the French, because they were attacked on their march, and at a moment at which they did not expect a general engagement. One may thence conclude, that the attack of an army on its march has lost nothing of its importance; and in giving the following observations, it need only be remarked, that they are founded upon the system of marches, encampments, and orders of battle in continued lines.

"The attack of an army on march is equally advantageous with the attack upon the extremity of a line, and for the same reason, because an army attacked on the head of its columns is in the same relative position to the enemy as one assailed on one of its extremities, as shown by figure 1. Plate VII.

"The army A B is in a similar position to that of the King at Rosbach; C D, as that of the allies. Supposing C D in line of battle, it is evident that it would be attacked in perpendicular order on one of its flanks, as it would be on the head of its columns supposing it to be in march.

"The advantage of these two manœuvres consists in the defensive army being obliged to engage its battalions successively, whilst that which attacks

operates with vigour and overwhelms them in detail. It is not sufficient to this purpose, merely to attack the head of a column in march; the army A B must also move in a suitable direction: for instance, it must prolong horizontally, if the march of the columns be perpendicular to it, and perpendicularly if it be horizontal to it. The object of this movement should be, to oppose a whole line to the head of a column, or to the single extremity of an enemy's line. One can conceive in fact that two heads of columns might meet and deploy mutually, whence there would result a parallel order of battle, a shock of two equal fronts, a total want of combination, as shown by figure 2. Plate VII.

"The army A B, in two columns, meets the army C D, also in two columns. Each fearing to be attacked, deploys as quickly as possible. A B forms the line F G, and C D the line H I. This formation of the parallel order of battle, of battalion against battalion, and front against front, is without contradiction a proof of incapacity in the commanders. Armies so engaged may destroy each other without any great result; and whichever carries the victory, it does not owe it to its general.

"An army attacked on its march should first of all form a crotchet; that is, the brigade forming the head of the column should deploy on its centre,

or to the right or left of the column, making with it a crotchet, as shown by figure 3, Plate VII.

"The advance guard or head of the column, B I H, being attacked, deploys in A G and B D, to the right or left of the column, according to the direction of the attack, and thus forms a crotchet. This manœuvre is necessary to resist the first effort of the enemy, F G; but the army I H being thus protected, ought not to follow the advance guard, and form in parallel order to the enemy, any more than an army attacked on one of its flanks should, after having made front or crotchet with the brigade on the menaced flank, continue a change of front in the same direction, and form parallel to the enemy. These manœuvres might do for indifferent commanders, but a true general, when attacked in this manner, should order the brigade engaged, to defend the ground inch by inch, and to retire upon a second placed in échelon. In the mean time he should change the direction of the rest of his army, by a half wheel of platoons, and march upon an extremity of the enemy's line, as in the annexed figure.

"The army A A, in two lines, is attacked by the army B B, also in two lines, on one of its extremities, or on the heads of its columns, supposing it in march. The brigades C C, which compose either the flank of the line or the heads of the

columns, change front, or form crotchet, according as to whether the army A A be in line or column; by this means they oppose the enemy, and cover the army A A, which takes the position D D, by a little flank movement by platoons, then marches upon the extremity of the enemy's line B B, and thereby recovers all the advantages of the attack. If a general should prefer changing direction immediately, without halting, he can make the half wheels of platoon E E, and march upon the lines F F.

"From this disposition there will result an oblique order of attack upon a flank of the adversary, who certainly will not dare to pursue the brigades in retreat, being himself liable to be attacked advantageously, if his opponent acts with vigour and precision. This manœuvre is much more simple and more rapid than a change of front, and it gives the inestimable advantage of establishing the whole army upon an extremity of the opposite line, whilst the change of front, which probably could never be accomplished, does no more than establish the parallel order.

"If this manœuvre appear complicated, others may be substituted for it, provided the end be to bring the main body of the army upon a single wing of the enemy. It is in circumstances such as these, that a general can appreciate a theory founded upon true principles. An ordinary man,

who has no guide but experience, will always be surprized and embarrassed, when informed that the heads of his columns are attacked, or one of his wings overthrown; but if he knows the just value of the position in which he is placed, and the counter-manœuvres he can oppose, he will order them with a calmness that only confidence in his resources can inspire, and will communicate to his army his feelings of security. Experience in such cases can do no more than measure distances with accuracy, and adapt the manœuvres to the nature of the ground."

I have chosen the battle of Leuthen as an example of the oblique order of attack. The following account of it is given by De Jomini:* "Frederick, having happily terminated the expedition against the combined army by the battle of Rosbach, and having nothing more to fear for Saxony, determined to march rapidly into Silesia to arrest the progress of the Austrians: he left Leipsic on the 2d November, 1757, with 18 battalions and 28 squadrons.

"This corps arrived on the 28th at Parchewitz, and halted there until the 3d December. It was lodged and supported during the march by the communes through which it passed. This measure, rendered indispensable by the impossibility

* See Plates VIII. and IX.

of transporting any thing besides the most necessary supplies, and by the want of magazines on the route, enabled the troops to support the fatigue of such a long forced march. The King, fearing that the Austrian division left in Lusatia, under the orders of Generals Marschal and Hadditch, would annoy him on his march, directed Marshal Keith with a small corps, by the high mountains upon Marienburgh, Pasburg, and thence into Bohemia, in order to draw the attention of the enemy upon this province. The Marshal executed this enterprize with success; pushed on by Commottau, and Laun, and Leutmeritz; destroyed the magazines which were there; burnt the bridge upon the Elbe; raised heavy contributions, and retired into Saxony at the approach of General Marschal, where he went into winter-quarters. During his march to Parchewitz, the King had learnt the most disastrous news. That of the fall of Schweidnitz was immediately followed by the loss of the battle of Breslau, the capture of the Duke of Bevern, the surrender of Breslau, and the defection of the Silesian regiments. Desertion had risen to such a height, that on leaving the town, eleven battalions mustered only 400 bayonets. The regiments of Silesian cavalry also did not show more than a third of their complement. This army of the Duke of Bevern, reduced to 15,000 men, under the command of

Ziethen, joined the King at Parchewitz on the 3d. His united force then amounted to nearly 30,000 combatants. The Austrian army mustered 80,000. Proud of their late successes and of so imposing a superiority, they nicknamed the King's army, the Parade of Potsdam.

"Continued prosperity sometimes bewilders great minds; seems to deprive them of their natural vigour, and to let them down to the level of ordinary beings. Adversity, on the contrary, is the only tonic capable of restoring these minds to the energy and elasticity they had lost.

"Frederick was especially so circumstanced. He assembled his generals and staff officers, acquainted them with all his reverses, and declared that he depended more than ever upon the zeal, the constancy, the courage and patriotism, which had always animated them, to wrest from the enemy the advantages he had obtained. He charged them to communicate these things to the officers, and even to the soldiers of the army, to prepare them for the great actions which were quickly to take place; forewarning them, that it would be necessary to attack the Austrians wherever they met them, without regard to their superiority in numbers; and finally, declaring that their bravery, which was capable of surmounting every obstacle, of carrying every entrenchment and every position, guaranteed him a happy result; and also,

that the recollection of the victory of Rosbach was a lucky omen. (This battle had been fought that day month.) What man could be insensible to a discourse of such energy; of such noble confidence? What man but must burn with desire to march immediately to the enemy, in order to prove himself worthy of it? In fact, the spirits of the army were raised to madness; all idea of danger vanished, and gave place to the presentiment of victory.

" Immediately after the junction with Ziethen, the troops were disposed conformably to the annexed order of battle.

" On the 4th of December the army left Parchewitz, and marched in the following order to Neumarck: the advance guard was composed of 800 volunteers; of 10 battalions; of the foot chasseurs, and free* battalions; of all the hussars of the army, excepting Werner's; of the dragoons of Zetteritz, Norman, and Jeune Krokow, drawn from the right wing of the cavalry; and lastly, of a battery of 10 twelve-pounders.

" The army followed in four columns; it marched by wings and by the right, or right in front. The first column was composed of two lines of cavalry of the right wing. The second comprised two lines of infantry of the right wing.

* A species of light troops.

The third was formed by the left wing of the infantry. The fourth by the left wing of the cavalry, also in two lines. The heavy artillery was divided into two brigades, in rear of the two columns of infantry.

"The advance guard met at Neumarck a corps of 4,000 Croats, of whom 200 were sabred, and 600 made prisoners; the rest were dispersed, and all the ovens fell into the hands of the Prussians. Head-quarters were established at this town, with 10 battalions; the infantry of the advance guard cantoned at Kemmendorf; the cavalry encamped in front. The infantry of the main body encamped in rear of this village, and the cavalry on this side of Neumarck: the heavy artillery crossed the town, and took position on the other side. The King learnt the same evening that Prince Charles had broken up his camp at Breslau, passed the Lohe and the Schweidnitz rivers, and was encamped on this side of the latter.

"The army marched on the 5th before break of day; the grenadiers of Burgdorf occupied the castle of Neumarck; those of Platz and Ostreich remained with the baggage and the train of artillery. In other respects the order of march was the same as that of the preceding day. The advance guard formed before Kemmendorf; the cavalry in the first line; the infantry, upon the heights, in a second. The battery of 10 twelve-

pounders was placed in advance of this position, in which the advance guard waited for daylight, and the arrival of the main body of the army. The troops were told that they were in presence of the enemy; this news caused universal joy; the eyes of these brave men sparkled with impatience to engage, and every thing promised them victory.*

"The weather being cloudy, prevented the enemy's discovering their march. The cavalry of the advance guard surprized the corps of General Nostitz, composed of three regiments of Saxon dragoons, and two of Austrian hussars, posted near Borna; a part were killed; 11 officers and 540 soldiers were taken prisoners, and the rest were driven back upon their main body. In the mean while the infantry of the advance guard had thrown itself into the brushwood and high cover in front of Polkendorf, Lampersdorf, and Katlau, in order to protect this attack. The columns of the main body, nevertheless, pursued their march in the best order. Never did troops afford a finer scene; the heads of the columns always preserved the same line, and the necessary distances for forming, and even the hastening the march of the columns did not derange this order.

* This narrative was copied by Jomini from Tempelhof, a Prussian officer, who wrote a History of the Seven Years' War, and who was himself engaged in this action.

"The carrying of Borna facilitated the reconnoitring of the enemy by the King. He found their line resting with its right on the wood of Nissern, the flank covered by the ponds and the village; thence it extended to the rear of Frobelwitz and Leuthen: the left wing was posted between the last mentioned village and Sagetschutz; the corps of Nadasty rested on this wing, and formed a crotchet, prolonged to the marsh of Johlau; a division of cavalry connected this corps with the left of the main army at Leuthen.

"The appearance of the Prussian advance guard in the neighbourhood of Lampersdorf, and the affair with the corps of Nostitz, which retreated upon the right wing of the Austrians, made the Count de Luchesi, who commanded it, think that the king was going to attack him, and with this idea, he repeatedly solicited reinforcements. At last, Marshal Daun, not being able to discover the King's march, which was concealed by the hills, suffered himself to be moved by his entreaties, and marched himself to the support of the right wing with the reserve.

"Frederick knew the ground too well not to perceive, at first sight, the weak side of the Austrians. The right of their position was too well protected to be attacked; he resolved therefore to direct all his efforts on their left, and to this purpose he refused his own. As soon as the heads

of the columns had passed Borna, they changed direction to the right, and formed with the utmost simplicity into two columns of lines, by a single wheel of the leading platoons at F. The advance guard remained on the left, being destined to commence the attack:

"The army, which then marched in columns of lines, in order of battle, (the cavalry on the wings, and the infantry in the centre,) arrived a little after noon on the hills between Lobetintz and Kartechutz. They were now so near the enemy, that Tempelhof (the Prussian historian) himself discovered their whole line, from the windmill of Lobetintz. The advance guard received orders to attack. As soon as it had left on its right the villages of Kartechutz and Strigwitz, it formed: six battalions of its right were placed en potence to cover the left flank of the cavalry, and the four others attacked the village, supported by the fire of their battery of 10 twelve-pounders.

"Nadasty had been placed on the left, in order to outflank the Prussian army. His cavalry, indeed, were seen to debouch from behind the wood, and attack that of the Prussians, and even to make it yield; but the battalions of the advance guard, formed in H, directed a constant fire upon them, and forced them to retire with precipitation. Then the fire of artillery and musketry

became general on both sides. It was one o'clock; the six battalions above mentioned attacked the abbattis, guarded by the Wurtemburgh grenadiers, and dislodged them. General Wedel, with the four remaining battalions of the advance guard, marched upon the large battery of the enemy in position on the heights of Sangschutz, and carried it after a short resistance. All Nadasty's division was thereby thrown into disorder. Some battalions only attempted to reform behind a ditch, but were soon overthrown.

" In the mean while, Daun, who had so inopportunely detached his reserve to support his right, discovering the Prussian columns on his left, directed there the cavalry of Esterhazy, and the second line of infantry, under the orders of Generals Maguire and Angern. The Prussian army continued to advance, still prolonging to its right, and as the advance guard followed the same direction, the enemy found himself constantly outflanked upon his left, whilst the six battalions of the right of the advance guard took him in reverse by the direction of their march. In this manner the several corps of the enemy's line, which came up in succession to maintain the fight, were beaten as soon as they attempted to form. The Austrian left wing thus retiring in disorder, the King ordered the grand battery of the advance guard to march to its left, and follow

the movements of the army. This precaution was very useful. The Austrians tried to form, in rear of Gohlau, a line en potence, in order to cover their flank; but the battery enfiladed it, whilst it was exposed in front to the fire of musketry; it was therefore impossible for the troops to remain in it.

"The Prussian cavalry of the right wing, which until then had been paralyzed by the nature of the ground, which was covered with brushwood and intersected by hedges and ditches, found, in rear of Gohlau, a space favourable for acting. The hussars of Ziethen charged the Bavarian and Wurtemburg infantry, who were retiring in disorder, sabred a great number, and made 2000 prisoners. In this interval, the Austrian generals formed with the remainder of their army a crotchet, the salient angle of which rested on Leuthen; they also posted all the artillery they could collect, upon the heights in rear of this village: it had been occupied from the beginning by a division of infantry, to which were successively united the reserve, which had returned from the right, and the fugitives, who threw themselves into the burial grounds and into the houses. All appeared resolved to defend it to the last extremity. The Prussian army, arrived at L, was not less determined to carry it at all hazards. Two battalions of the guards, and one of Retzow, charged it

directly, and one of the most terrible combats that have been witnessed was fought there. The enemy defended the place with fury, and Frederick advanced all his infantry upon them, so that the left wing, which was to have been continually refused, was engaged, and took a very active part in the combat. At last the guard penetrated into Leuthen, and forced the Austrians to abandon it. This event contributed much to the victory; nevertheless, the enemy did not appear disposed to yield the field of battle altogether; they still defended themselves on the other side of the village behind some ravines, where the grenadiers, and some other corps of infantry, stood firm; but disorder soon gained ground in their army, and they began to take flight.

"During the attack upon the village, General Driesen made a front charge with the cavalry of the right wing, upon that of the left wing of the Austrians; whilst the dragoons of Bareith marched to the right, to take it in flank. Although the Prussians were exposed to a murderous fire of case-shot, they nevertheless overthrew the enemy, and drove him from the field of battle. Driesen then impetuously charged the Austrian infantry, and captured whole battalions. The right of the Imperialists had no better fate; it had left its position to prolong itself to the left, whilst the rest of the army, having re-formed at Leuthen,

still made head there. It marched to P ; the cavalry of the Prussian left wing, which until then had halted at Lobetintz, perceiving this movement, followed the enemy, charged and outflanked him, and, having overthrown the cavalry, fell upon the infantry. These two attacks accelerated the evacuation of Leuthen.

" The Austrians finally attempted to re-form a third time; but the Prussian army, marching rapidly and in the same direction, continually outflanked their right. The Imperial cavalry having also retired from the combat, that of the King charged their infantry and made a great number of prisoners. There then remained to them no better alternative than to retire behind the Schweidnitz wasser by the three bridges of Rathen, Lissa, and Goldshmeide. After the battle, the Prussians took up their last position between Gukerwitz and Lissa.

" The army having halted, Frederick galloped along the front of the line, and inquired if any battalions were inclined to follow him to Lissa. The grenadiers of Manteufel, of Wedel, and the regiment of Bornstedt, immediately shouldered their arms and followed him. When he arrived at Lissa, the houses of the village were still filled with Austrians, amongst whom were many wounded. The King went to the castle, accompanied by some officers of his staff, and passed

through a numerous assemblage of Austrian officers to occupy the apartment prepared for him. But when the grenadiers entered the village, they were fired upon from all the houses. Without a moment's hesitation, they rushed into them, and put all who resisted to the sword. When the Prussian generals arrived at Lissa, the King told them, with an air of satisfaction, that it was but right that they should repose after such painful exertions; thanked them in the most obliging terms for the new proofs of zeal and bravery which they had just shown him, and ordered them to express his satisfaction to all his troops.

"The army marched on the 6th by lines, right in front, and passed the Schweidnitz wasser. The enemy had retired behind the Lohe, and had united his fugitives in the environs of Breslaw. General Buccow occupied Hæfgen and Mochber with the rear-guard; he retired at the approach of the Prussian hussars. Prince Charles of Lorraine marched at three in the afternoon, and retired by Borau upon Schweidnitz, and thence into Bohemia.

"Ziethen was ordered to pursue him on the 7th, with 11 battalions and 65 squadrons; he obliged him to quit Silesia in 14 days. The garrison which the Austrians had left in Leignitz, and which amounted to 3000 men, capitulated, but with liberty to retire, which appears incon-

ceivable, as the Prussians might have forced them to surrender at discretion.

"Tempelhof makes the following calculation of the losses of the Austrians in consequence of this memorable battle:

6,500 killed or wounded; but as the greater part of the last were carried to Breslaw, he reckons only . . .	3,000
Prisoners	21,500
Taken at Breslaw, according to a return	17,146
Taken by Ziethen in the pursuit . .	2,000
Hors de combat at Neumarck the evening before the battle	800
Deserters, at least	6,000
	50,446
According to accurate reports, Prince Charles re-entered Bohemia with regular infantry	9,000
Cavalry and light troops	28,000
Which makes the force of the army on the day of the action	87,446

The following remarks upon this memorable action are selected from De Jomini.

"A parallel line, considerably reinforced on the important point of the attack, is doubtless good; because it is conformable to the principle laid down as the base of all operations. It has however several inconveniences. The weak part of

the line being too near the enemy may be engaged in spite of itself, which would balance and arrest advantages gained on another point. Besides the reinforced wing may defeat that which is opposed to it, and yet not be able to attack the enemy's line in flank and reverse, without making a wide movement, which would separate it from the other divisions in case they were also engaged. If these divisions, on the contrary, should not be in action, and should be able to follow the movement of the reinforced wing, this movement would necessarily be circular; whilst the counter-manœuvre of the enemy would be on the chord of the arc, and consequently more rapid, and would enable him to assume the offensive on the principal point, by being the first to direct upon it the main body of his forces.

"It is far otherwise with the oblique order employed by the king at Leuthen. The wing attacked is not only overwhelmed by an entire line, but its flank is also continually commanded, and its line taken in reverse, without any manœuvre or prolongation of direction, upon the part of the assailants, but by a simple march to the front of the oblique line. The distance of the divisions not intended for the principal attack from the enemy, also prevents all danger of their being engaged by superior forces, and enables them successively to support the attacking wing.

"These results of the open oblique order, although well known, can never be too often pressed upon the attention of military men. This order presents another still more decisive advantage. It is, that the extremity of the wing attacked (suppose it to be the two flank brigades) receives, successively, the charge of half the attacking army, without being able to check its march by any counter-manœuvre. What troops can maintain such a contest, when also outflanked and attacked in reverse? Must not fear and trouble spread through a line, thus overthrown on its flank, and menaced with entire destruction by the enemy in its rear?

"Such are the infallible results of an attack in oblique order, when the flank of the adversary can be gained imperceptibly, by the means already pointed out, and when the line is rapidly formed by Frederick's simple method already explained.

"The figure 1. Plate IX. will demonstrate this in the clearest manner.

"The left wing B C of the army A C will receive the fire of the second brigade of the army D K L, whilst the first brigade formed in columns of platoons will outflank it, so as quickly to decide this first attack. The second brigade, in following its oblique prolongation, will find itself immediately supported by the third, which will attack

on the extremity of the line and continue to outflank it by marching straight to the front. When past this extremity, the fourth brigade will replace it and do the same. Supposing the army D F K L arrived at the dotted line H I, the whole line will be engaged with a fourth, or at the most with a third of the enemy's line, whose battalions will be crushed and almost surrounded in succession.

"This demonstration will doubtless suffice to enforce the advantages of the open oblique order. I have thus named every disposition of attack similar to the king's at Leuthen, because it almost formed a right angle with the Austrian line, and differed entirely from a parallel disposition, in that the refused wing, being always nearer to that part of the enemy's line upon which an attack is made, than to any other, it can support the principal point of the attack, without putting it in the power of the enemy to engage it with a great numerical superiority.

"All these advantages of the oblique order, although connected with the supposition of an army attacking in line of battle, are equally applicable to masses concentrated upon the extremity intended to be overpowered, as shown by figure 2. Plate IX.

"The army A B, instead of forming two lines like the army D F K L in the preceding figure,

forms only one, line with part of its forces; the surplus is disposed in close columns, at half distance, upon the two wings and the centre, to manœuvre, or make vigorous efforts when wanted. This formation renders more moveable the troops not intended for the first attack, and covers them from all the movements of the enemy.

"The battle of Leuthen also furnishes another important maxim; it is, that an army whose flanks rest upon an obstacle, such as the great pond of Gohlau which covered the crotchet of Nadasty, may nevertheless be outflanked and exposed to an oblique attack. For this purpose it is sufficient to place a corps in observation of the enemy's brigade posted there, and so to form line as to direct the principal effort against the second brigade. It is evident that, as soon as the line is broken and loses its support, these difficulties of the ground will be of no use to him, and will even tend to the capture of the first brigade if it maintains its position. This manœuvre is certainly not equally good with an attack upon an exposed flank, but it is nevertheless good, and proves that no position can secure an army against a skilful enemy, and that the only way to resist him is to manœuvre in the same sense, that is, offensively."

I have mentioned in Chapter XII., the impro-

priety of establishing a crotchet in front of a line; as this is not so immediately evident as the other maxims I have adduced, I shall cite the battle of Prague as an example. The following critical account is given by De Jomini, and is well worth attention, not only on account of its exemplifying this particular maxim, but also as a fine specimen of topographical description. The baron declares himself personally acquainted with the ground.*

"As soon as Prince Charles of Lorraine had taken the command of the Austrian armies, he passed the Moldau, and encamped with his left wing upon Mount Ziska, and his right near the village of Kyge. The village of Maleschitz was in rear of the right of the infantry. The army was formed in several lines, and, according to custom, the cavalry was placed on the wings. Head-quarters were at Nusl. The object of the Prince was to unite with the divisions of Count Koningseck, who had been repulsed by Marshal Schwerin, and also to await the arrival of Daun, who was marching from Moravia with a considerable force.

"The camp of the Austrians was situated upon a chain of hills, extending from Hortlorzes to Prague, in parts rocky, arid, very high, and in some places very steep. In front of these hills were others, rather lower and covered with vines. Their direction followed the course of the Moldau. The

* See Plate X.

roads cut through them were so narrow and difficult, that an army could scarcely march upon them in column of platoons.

"The heights began to lower near Kyge, whence they gradually lost themselves in the plain, near Sterboholi; so that between this hamlet, and the villages of Dubetsch, Nieder Micholup, and Hostiwortz, cavalry could act with advantage.

"Upon the right flank, and farther in advance, there were a great number of ponds, connected by a rivulet, which, rising at Micholup, ran in a winding course through Podschernitz, Kyge, Hortlorzes, Loupetin, Wissozan, and emptied itself into the Moldau near Lubau.

"On the other side there were also very lofty hills, which commencing near the Moldau, followed the rivulet through Prosick and Gebel. These two chains formed an unequal and marshy bottom, in which it was extremely difficult to march. The only passages at all practicable were those near Hostawitz, through the village of Kyge, and between that village and Hortlorzes, where the hills were less lofty and steep.

"Below this first village there were some dried ponds covered with grass, so that at a certain distance they could not be distinguished from the meadows which fringed the banks of the rivulet. Between these ponds, causeways had been made for the communication of the villages on the river. There existed besides these, some paths where

only one person could pass at a time. To conclude, there were several small lakes near Hostawitz and Kyge, and to get at this last village it was necessary to traverse the causeway between two of these lakes.

"From this description of the ground, it will easily be imagined, that the left and centre of this first position were so strong by nature that they required but the right disposition of a very few battalions to defend them. The right wing and its flank, occupying a post which although advantageous, was yet liable to be turned, gave every thing to fear in this quarter, from an enterprizing enemy.

"Prince Charles had too much experience not to feel the importance of this circumstance. As soon as the corps of Koningseck had joined him, and he had learnt that Marshal Schwerin was close behind it, he changed his camp. The left and centre remained as before, but the right was thrown back so as to form a crotchet, the salient angle of which was upon the hills between Kyge and Maleschitz. Not daring to depart from the ancient method of placing the cavalry on both wings, he did not withdraw that on the left, which was thereby rendered absolutely incapable of acting.

"After this change the army was posted with its right upon the hillocks behind Sterboholi, at a certain distance from this hamlet. In order to

cover the angle of the crotchet, some battalions were placed on the heights between Kyge and Loupetin, on this side of the hollow. An entrenchment was also constructed there, and a battery put in position.

"The artillery of position, and that of the field, were spread along the front, and were so well disposed on the heights, that the batteries reciprocally flanked each other, and swept every thing around. Some works were even commenced, but not finished. All these defensive measures being completed, Prince Charles thought he might brave, with 100,000 men, the efforts of the two Prussian armies united. The ground in front of the crotchet being very much intersected, the enemy could not form there but with great difficulty, and under the fire of a formidable artillery. But, on the other hand, this crotchet had a great inconvenience. Its right flank was so badly posted as to prevent its being a good defence, unless the enemy, being already in march to attack, should be forced to divide to gain its extremity. In every other case, a crotchet, or order en potence, when intended as a cover to a flank against an army well trained in manœuvres, is a remedy worse than the evil. In fact, its extremity ought to be as well covered as that of a right line, and, if it can be turned, it is worse than useless. It has, besides, another grievous disad-

vantage, which is, that the troops, which are near the point of the salient angle, cannot retrograde without pressing on each other, and rendering disorder and confusion inevitable, nor can they advance without either leaving a great interval between them, or otherwise closing into the right and left, which causes a vacillation throughout the line, and if this take place at the moment of attack, the greatest disorder and the most disastrous consequences may ensue.

"In the last place, a general who can seize upon every favourable circumstance, and turn it to his profit, will establish a cross-fire on the salient angle, which will sweep away the battalions on the extremity.

"All, then, that the Austrian general gained by his change of position, was the advantage of forcing the Prussians to make a wider movement in order to attack him. As soon as Schwerin had crossed the Elbe at Brandeis, on the 4th of May, 1757, and encamped at Prassin and Mischitz, Frederick conceived the hardy project of leaving Marshal Keith upon the left bank of the Moldau, with 22,000 men, whilst he should join Marshal Schwerin, and with 63,000, attack the enemy on the side of his communication, without regard to the strength of his position. With this intent he marched, after mid-day, on the 4th, with a corps of 20 battalions and 38 squadrons

behind the left wing of the army, posted at Weleslavin, and passed the night under arms. On the morning of the 5th, the King proceeded with this detachment to Prodbaba, the hills at which place commanded those of the opposite bank. The pontoon train followed in close columns, and some pontoons were launched into the river, and two battalions of grenadiers and some foot chasseurs passed over to the right bank, in order to dislodge the enemy, who might have opposed the construction of the bridge. As soon as the bridge was ready, the King fired three rounds, to warn the Marshal of his being about to cross. On the same evening he encamped his corps near Czimitz. At five, on the morning of the 6th, Frederick marched in the greatest silence to meet the Marshal, who, on his part, was marching in four columns at a little after midnight. As soon as the heads of the King's columns had arrived near Stretzikow, they discovered the army of Schwerin, and effected their junction immediately. The troops were then organized according to the annexed table.

"After this, Frederick formed his army with its right at Stretzikow, and its left towards Sattalitze, and advanced with the Marshal to the hills in front, in order to reconnoitre the enemy. Perceiving that their front was inattackable, he dispatched Schwerin, at a gallop, to ascertain if it

were possible to turn their right flank. The Marshal observed that the Austrian right wing did not as yet extend to Sterboholi; and that their flank was exposed, it being posted on hillocks, which, gradually lowering into the plain, offered an easy access to infantry. He also thought, that on the right of the front of this wing, he could perceive a plain very favourable to the action of cavalry; and in advance of this front a green flat, which he took for meadows. As the ground was surrounded by ponds, which seemed to draw off the water from it, he was of opinion, that this flat was at least practicable for infantry; that the cavalry might follow farther to the left, and the artillery by the causeway. On examining the plan, one will be convinced that the Marshal conjectured according to all probability, and that he cannot be reproached with his mistake.

" As soon as the King had received his report, he ordered the army to march by columns of lines, left in front, which was executed with promptitude and precision.

" The heads of the Prussian columns were already at Nieder Podschernitz, before the Austrians perceived this movement; perhaps this was owing to the nature of the ground; perhaps, also, to their thinking the King would not attack them on that day. Be that as it may, their infantry remained quietly in the camp, and their cavalry were foraging.

"The imperial cavalry received orders to recal their foragers, to mount immediately, and to take post in the plain behind Micholup. The cavalry on the left wing was withdrawn, and hastily directed on the same point. There it deployed in three lines, and, the more easily to stop the progress of the enemy, the hussars of General Haddick formed a crotchet in advance, the extreme right of which approached the pond of Nieder Micholup, and thus formed a re-entering angle with the rest of the cavalry. The infantry marched by the right, and arrived on the heights of Sterboholi before the Prussians were formed.

"In the mean time the King's army had continued its march. The infantry left Podschernitz on their left. A large body of cavalry and heavy artillery passed through this village.

"As soon as the left wing arrived at Sterboholi Marshal Schwerin ordered it to form, and march to the enemy. A large portion of the infantry crossed the causeway, some battalions defiled upon little bridges and narrow paths. The grenadiers of this wing, together with the regiments of Schwerin, Fouquet, and Kreutz, were to traverse the meadows, which could not be done without confusion. Many battalions were obliged to break or march by files; those which traversed this meadow found it much more marshy than had been expected. The dragged pond above all

caused disorder; on this point the troops could scarcely wade through the mud. The regiments of Meyerinck and Treskow fell in up to their knees and had infinite pain to get out.

"The regimental cannon almost all remained in the rear, and the infantry were thus deprived of a support of which they had the greatest need, since these delays had allowed time for the enemy to furnish his front with a formidable artillery. At last this brave infantry succeeded in deploying. It was one o'clock, and it would have been convenient to have rested one minute; but the impetuosity of the soldiers was so great, that they immediately rushed upon the Austrians, who opened a terrible fire of case-shot. The King had ordered the battalions not to fire, but to attack with the bayonet; this order was punctually obeyed, but at too great a distance from the enemy, as the battalions had to march in line 400 paces with their bayonets at the charge.* The fire of the artillery became so frightful and murderous that it was im-

* It is astonishing that a whole line of battle should have marched 400 paces with charged bayonets. It is perhaps the first instance of the kind; without wishing to excite doubts as to the truth of this fact, we will observe that such an attack can have no force or impulse. It would have been better to have formed a front of 20 battalions, each battalion in column of attack, lining by the centre, and to have come to the charge on reaching the enemy.

possible to fill up the vacancies it occasioned. The grenadiers, until then unshakeable, were obliged to retire, and the other regiments did the same.

" As soon as the Austrian grenadiers perceived this retrograde movement, they descended from the hills in the most spirited manner, and pursued the Prussians sword in hand. They have often employed this weapon, and have always suffered in consequence. They were particularly accustomed to do so, when the enemy were retiring, because it then appears most advantageous; but if this manœuvre be compared with the nature of modern arms, it will doubtless be found a very bad one, as in order to effect it, the musket must be thrown away or slung over the shoulder; in the first case the principal weapon is lost, and in the second, the march of the line exceedingly embarrassed. The Austrians copied this system from the Janissaries, not recollecting that the latter were unacquainted with the bayonet. On this occasion their grenadiers did not wound a single man, and the battalions which had deployed against them retired upon the pond of Dubetsch.

" Whilst these events were passing, the Prussian cavalry of the left wing crossed by the causeway of Sterboho. li, and formed in the plain on the left, resting their flank on the pond of Micholup. This cavalry, commanded by Prince Schoneich, was

only 65 squadrons strong, and yet the Austrian cavalry, 104 squadrons strong, formed in three lines, waited its attack behind this pond without offering any opposition to its passage. The Austrian general must have been slow of perception, since he did not profit by the embarrassment of the Prussian squadrons. Prince Schoneich, immediately perceiving the great superiority of the enemy, and the risk he ran of being overwhelmed and attacked in flank, if he permitted them to recollect themselves, charged as soon as his troops were formed, and broke the first line of the Austrians. This movement, however, exposed his flanks, and the second Austrian line charging him at the same moment, he was obliged to retire. The prince reformed, to try another charge, which succeeded no better. Colonel Warnery,* posted behind the left of the infantry, then advanced with five squadrons of hussars. Leaving the pond of Micholup on his right, he manœuvred so skilfully, that he fell upon the flank of General Haddick, and overthrew several Austrian corps of cavalry. At this moment General Ziethen brought up several regiments of the cavalry of the right wing, amongst others his own

* This officer, afterwards a general, was a native of the Pays Du Vaud in Switzerland. He has left a treatise on cavalry which is much esteemed. He has also written on the Turkish war, the Seven Years' War, &c.

hussars, and those of Werner. The third charge was decisive. The Austrian cavalry was dispersed; part was thrown upon the infantry, and part pursued through Sabietitz. The squadrons which attempted to reform were overthrown by Stechow's dragoons, united with those under Colonel Warnery; the right wing of the enemy's infantry was thus shaken and thrown into disorder.

"During this cavalry fight, Marshal Schwerin made the greatest exertions to reform his infantry. He ordered some battalions of the second line to the front, and to repulse the pursuing enemy, which was soon effected. Annoyed by the retreat of his regiment, which had followed the others, he dismounted to conduct the charge, seized a standard, and led. At this moment the hero fell. He had the consolation of seeing his regiment and the rest of the line imitate his generous devotion, and march enthusiastically to the enemy.

"Many generals, after his example, led their brigades on foot, exhorting them to imitate their chief. This attack was irresistible, and the Austrians, who the moment before had been the pursuers, were quickly put to the rout.

"A Russian officer, in the Austrian service, says that it was so complete, that the army resembled a flock of sheep in full flight. It was the more difficult to reform the infantry as all the cavalry experienced the same fate at the same moment.

"The manœuvre which the Austrian army had made in presence of the Prussians, of forming a crotchet, in order to gain ground, and prevent being attacked in flank or reverse, was necessarily attended with several inconveniences. The columns lengthened out extremely, in consequence of the rapidity of the march, and also of its difficulty from the nature of the ground.

"It followed, that when the battalions were formed on the right, a great interval was left near the salient angle, in addition to which, the line having taken its alignment from the right, which was upon the heights of Sterboholi, the left wing of the crotchet was obliged to be thrown a little forward, and the space between the left wing of the army (which rested with its right flank upon Hortlorzes) and the right was thereby increased. It appears, that the Austrians reckoned too much upon the difficulties of the ground between Kyge and Hortlorzes, or upon the corps entrusted with its defence, which was much too weak for its purpose, without being supported:

"Directly that the king perceived this error, he hastened to profit by it. As soon as the army had prolonged its movement to the left, until the grenadiers of the right wing were upon the road which led from Sattalitz to Kyge, he ordered the attack of this corps. General Manstein advanced

to it immediately, with three battalions of grenadiers, supported by cavalry, and the regiments Izemplitz and Manteufel. The grenadiers had received orders to use the bayonet, and they marched to the enemy under a terrible fire, without returning a shot until quite close. After some rounds, the enemy withdrew his cannon from his entrenchments and evacuated them. The carrying of this post was an important advantage, because its batteries enfiladed the flank of the battalions which were attacking beyond Kyge and Hostawitz, and annoyed them exceedingly; also because the acquisition of it by the Prussian infantry placed them at the same time upon the left flank of the crotchet, and the right flank of the left wing of the Austrian army. This left wing extended to Mount Ziska; from that moment the victory was decided.

"During this time, the king had passed through Kyge at the head of his right wing. His object was to penetrate into the interval of which we have spoken. All the difficulties of art and nature, united to the determined opposition of the enemy, were surmounted. The troops performed prodigies of valour. Winterfield's regiment lost 1000 men out of 1400 who composed it, in the attack of one battery. It advanced, however, through showers of grape shot, as if it had been at a review. The grenadiers of Wreden, who supported this

regiment, had no better fate. In spite of this opposition, the enemy was broken, and his position carried.

"As soon as the Prussian line was reformed, as well as could be expected from the nature both of the contest and of the ground, it continued to advance and overthrow the enemy.' The Austrians reformed in several lines, so that when driven from one height, the retreat of the fugitives was always protected by a line drawn up on the next.

"At last the Prussian left wing having totally defeated the right of the Austrians, and prolonging itself by its left to Sabietitz, in the direction of the Moldau, the Austrian left and centre were cut off and forced to take refuge in Prague. The advance of the king after the battle was so conducted, that his right was not far from the Maison des Invalides, and his left was in the neighbourhood of Wischered.

"Prince Maurice was ordered to cross the Moldau near Branick, and attack the rear of the enemy. This he could not do for want of pontoons. This contre-tems saved the Austrians from total ruin. They endeavoured to escape from the lesser town, and to retreat by Schomichow and Koningsaal, but were repulsed by Marshal Keith. Another column attempted to retire along the banks of the Moldau, on the side

of Wicherad. It was met by the Prussian left wing, and forced to re-enter Prague.

"Thus finished the battle of Prague, in which both parties displayed the greatest bravery. The dispositions of the king to attack the Austrians upon the side of their communications, and drive them into the city of Prague, were scientific. The Prussians lost on this memorable day, 3,400 killed, 8,800 wounded, and 1,500 prisoners. The Austrians lost 12,000 men killed and wounded, 4,000 prisoners, and 200 pieces of cannon. Marshal Brown also was mortally wounded."

Enough has perhaps been now said on the orders of attack and defence. De Jomini's reasoning appears to me so clear and forcible, that throughout this work I have employed even his words when I could do so, in preference to my own. He is particularly full on these last subjects, as being peculiar features in the victories of the Great Frederick; and seems desirous to show the various modes in which they may be applied, as also their compatibility with the present system of attacking in columns of battalions, rather than in two or more lines. Speaking of the disposition of troops in columns of attack, he says, "It has been remarked to me, that Lord Wellington almost always fought in line. This may be right for troops who are to remain on the defensive; but I am of opinion, that

for offensive and manœuvring wings he must have formed columns.*

"If not, they must have been in fault, who could suffer themselves to be beaten by equal forces, acting on such a system. For a General can wish for nothing better than for an adversary who should always manœuvre in line.

"On this subject, I again appeal to those generals who have served in the great European wars. However, when I give an order of battle as the most advantageous, I do not say that all victory is impossible where it is not strictly applied. Localities, general causes, superiority of number, the spirit of the troops and general, these are considerations which also enter in the account, and to reason about this general maxim, all these chances must be admitted to be equal."

With regard to the defence of villages or of entrenchments, as mentioned in Chapter XIII., the same maxims appear applicable to each. Many important hints may be derived from the Reveries of Marshal Saxe; a writer who has furnished the germ of many improvements, both in military institutions and tactics. The following remarks, by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, are, however, pecu-

* It is not to be understood that the columns must be formed on a space exactly square, but that the battalions should be so disposed, as to be able to arrive with equal promptitude from all points, at that which is to be attacked.

liarly useful, and are furnished by a later, and (to Englishmen) a more interesting example. On the subject of the defence of the fortified positions on the Nivelle, by Marshal Soult, in 1813, he says; "An error of minor arrangement might possibly be pointed out in the plan he adopted of forming his lines between the works and the attacking force, by which means, the fire of the redoubt was completely screened, until after the repulse of his line; when the assailants following close, the garrisons generally gave way at the same time, and the support merely served to cover their retreat. The redoubts on the heights of Ainhoe were very respectable, and if the 7,000, or 8,000 men formed in front of them, had been kept in reserve on their rear, leaving the fire of the work free, and had only acted against the allies when giving the assault, would not that operation have been rendered infinitely more difficult, and even hazardous?" It is remarkable that this officer's opinion should so exactly coincide with the general rule, advanced on this subject by the Baron de Jomini.

CONCLUSION.

The attentive reader of this little work will perceive that the great object to be attained in war is a *concentrated and overpowering attack* upon a point of *decisive importance*. A battle should not be fought excepting upon that point of the line of operations, by the command of which the enemy's line of communication is entirely broken: there, the attack should be made with spirit, and in such a manner as to give the most chances of success, and with such a direction as to conduce most rapidly and directly to the ruin of the enemy.

One of the most effectual methods of applying this general principle, is to begin with inducing the enemy to commit faults in opposition to it. This may be done by annoying him with some small corps of light troops on many important points of his communications. It is probable, that being ignorant of the strength of these corps, he will oppose them by strong divisions, and thus scatter his forces. These light troops also perform the essential service of pioneering, or feeling the way of the army. After all, something more than a skilful application of these

principles is necessary to the attainment of victory. "To render decisive the shock of a superior force," says Jomini, "a general must bestow no less care upon the military character, than "upon the manœuvres of his army. It is not the feelings of the soldier only, which are in question, but more particularly of those who conduct him. All troops are brave when their chiefs show an example of noble emulation and devotion to the service." A soldier should face danger rather from disdain of yielding to his officers in honour and bravery, than from fear of punishment; from confidence in the wisdom of his commanders, and the courage of his companions, than from dread of a rigorous discipline. He ought to obey his officer implicitly, from respect alone for the authority which the laws have confided to him.

"A general ought to be sure of the devotion of his lieutenants to the glory of the national arms. He should be certain that a shock will take place there, and when, he orders it. The first thing towards this, is that he should make himself beloved, esteemed, and feared. The next, that he should be entrusted with the choice and advancement of his lieutenants. If they hold their rank only by right of seniority, it may be established almost as a certainty, that they do not possess the necessary qualities to fulfil their important functions. This single circumstance is

sufficient to ruin the best planned enterprize. Courage alone is not sufficient to form a general, or Daun and Soubise would have been such, but they were totally deficient in military genius, and especially in that mental power, that energy in the council, which dictates grand resolutions, and which is the first virtue of a captain. A general should be as calm, as firm, and as immoveable on the field of battle, as when examining his map in the retirement of his closet; but if it should be necessary to choose between courage in the fight, and courage in the council, the last of these qualities should be preferred, in the selection of a commander in chief.

"Decisive plans are not formed amidst the tumult of battle, but in the silence of the cabinet. It is there especially, that a general should be great and unconquerable."

If the authority of talents and experience be of any weight, it is scarcely requisite to say more on this subject; but, as genius is necessary to the discovery and application of genius, there are periods in the military history of every nation when almost any claim of advancement is preferred to that of commanding talents and sound principles of war. Still it may be laid down as a maxim founded upon a thorough knowledge of human nature, that wherever the exercise of genius is required, the eligibility to office should

be limited by as few restrictions as possible; and in proportion as the qualities of the mind, and the acquirements of experience, necessary to the fulfilment of certain duties, are rare and valuable, so should the possession of them be deemed the chief, if not the only, recommendation to the rank entrusted with the execution of those duties. If there be any to whom these principles are not self-evident, the page of history will afford them ample testimony of their truth. It might be almost sufficient to mention to the British nation, that if these principles had not been in some measure followed, to the exclusion of the irrational system of employment by seniority, Sir Arthur Wellesley would not have conquered in Portugal, nor Wolfe in Canada. In stations of supreme command, where a judgment at once quick and comprehensive is required, where the coolness of deliberation must be united to the daring promptitude of passion, there are few perhaps who will deny the folly of expecting such qualifications equally from every man who outlives his competitors, or chances in any way to arrive at the head of an army list. It has been said by Sallust of Jugurtha, "Ac sane, quod difficillimum in primis est, et prælio strenuus erat, et bonus consilio; quorum alterum ex providentiâ timorem, alterum ex audaciâ temeritatem adferre plerumque solet." "Therefore," continues the

Roman historian, "did Scipio Africanus employ Jugurtha in almost all difficulties, esteeming him as a friend, and becoming more fond of him from day to day;" and by the same rule should the governors of every nation select and foster those, in whom so rare a union of commanding talents can be found: to their discovery and encouragement should they direct the tendency of their military systems and institutions, and by their advancement will they gratify the wishes of every true patriot.

These principles are not however confined in their application to the stations of supreme command, but must be extended to every situation, in which a man of talents, zeal, and activity is preferable to a sluggard and a fool; for whilst there is such variety in the abilities and characters of men, they must be fitted to their duties, or their duties can never be well performed.

APPENDIX.

It being the passion of the author to furnish every hint to his countrymen, which may occur to him, as likely to strengthen the military force of Britain, and to give permanency to that imposing character which it has acquired under the conduct of his Grace the Duke of Wellington, he has thought that the following observations on the constitution of the European armies at the declaration of war in 1792, extracted from the History of the Revolutionary War, by the Baron de Jomini, would form an acceptable addition to the Compilation of the First Principles of War. Excellent as is our military system at present, some lessons of improvement may perhaps be extracted from them, and much congratulation may be felt at discovering in some of them the principles of our present state of perfection.

"The conquerors of Leuthen, of Rosbach, of Torgau," says Jomini, "have proved, in the plains of Champagne and at the battle of Jena, that the glory of armies is transitory, and that more than *courage is wanting* to gain triumphs, or to constitute a good army.

"Those general causes which influence so strongly the destinies of nations, exercise the same empire over their military condition. Victories proceed partly from these causes, and develope the talents of generals, as well as the courage of soldiers. Still, it *cannot be concealed*, that inde-

pendent of the interior state of empires, *an army* possesses *within itself* the principles of its superiority, or inferiority, in the nature of *its organization, its character*, and *that of its chiefs*.

"The *real force* of a state, then, consists in the nature and character of its soldiers and officers; in its means of recruiting; in the organic institution of corps; in the talents and information of the officers composing its staff; in the genius of the generals who command; lastly, in the national feeling at the moment that war breaks out.

"Great results are obtained only by a re-union of these means; for if it be true that the skill of the general-in-chief is the first requisite to success, this chief will gain but fruitless victories, if the nation refuse to make the necessary sacrifices to profit by them, and he will be condemned, like the Carthaginian hero, to see his army destroyed by conquest.

"It is equally true, *that the best troops in the world*, conducted by a *weak* and *untalented* man, can meet with nothing but reverses. The French armies, after having eclipsed the Spanish bands, and triumphed over those of the celebrated William, lost at the fields of Ramillies, Hochstet and Turin, a lustre which they resumed under Marshal Saxe, to relapse into contempt under his successors.

"A good general staff is, above all, necessary to make a good army; it should be considered as the nursery, from which the commander-in-chief should select the instruments by which he works; as a collection of officers whose intelligence should second his own. When there is no harmony between the genius which commands and the talents which are to apply his conceptions, success becomes doubtful, for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in their execution. A good staff has also the advantage of being *more durable* than the *genius* of a *single man; it may remedy many evils*, and we may dare affirm, that *it is the best safeguard of an army*. Paltry party-interests, narrow

views, and a misplaced self-love, may rise against this assertion; it will, nevertheless, remain an incontrovertible truth to every thinking soldier and every enlightened statesman.* A well constituted staff is to an army what a skilful ministry is to a monarchy; it will second the efforts of the chief even when he can direct every thing himself; it will prevent faults, by supplying him with the best information, and will hinder them even when the general is unfit to command. How many great actions, both ancient and modern, which have illustrated the fame of men of but middling talents, have been prepared by those who surrounded them? Reynier was the chief instrument of the victories of Pichegru in 1794; and Dessoles had some share in the glory even of Moreau. The name of General Toll is to be connected with the successes of Kutusof; of Diebitsch with those of Barclay and Witgenstein; Gneisenau and Muffling with those of Blucher. How many other names might I add in support of these assertions!

"Finally, a brave and well-organized army, without a good system of recruiting, is but an imperfect machine. France felt the bad effects of it under Louis XV., and the Allies during the first wars of the Revolution. It is by

* "I do not esteem a staff to be well constituted *only* because extravagant study is required on the part of the young candidates. A man may be a profound mathematician, a good topographer, a correct draughtsman, and yet, a bad warrior. A staff, which should be good in every respect, should, in my opinion, be that which enjoys sufficient considerations and prerogatives, to offer advantages to the *officers of all the other arms*, and which would thus be composed of soldiers *already distinguished by their fitness for the service*. The officers of engineers and artillery would then cease to be the antagonists of an institution which would offer to them a greater field of distinction, and which would thenceforth be a collection of those officers of these arms, the most capable of directing an operation of war, and put at the discretion of the commander-in-chief for his assistance."—*Jomini*, vol. i. *Revolutionary War*, page 210.

such a system that the means of repairing one's losses are to be obtained; of repairing them without waiting for the slow operation of a voluntary enlistment; it is it alone which constitutes a national army, which enables a state to proportion its efforts to its dangers, and which procures an excellent species of soldier.

"The most efficacious and most simple method of giving to the national power of France, in 1792, all the play of which it was capable, in order to put it on a footing with that of other states, seems to have been to assure a good recruiting system for the troops of the line, as being the heart of the army, and afterwards to adopt, with some modifications, the system of militias, such as it exists in Switzerland, in order to serve as an auxiliary on great occasions. This simple institution, which ranges the whole military population of a country in stationary reserves and moveable battalions organized beforehand, exercised in the first elements of the manual and platoon exercise, and marching at beat of drum whenever the dangers of the country require it, is peculiarly suitable to the French nation,* and would at that time have been the best way of resisting the numerous enemies it was preparing for itself. They might, at first, have taken by lot from the militia the number of men requisite to complete the army; then, in time of war, have doubled the strength of regiments by adding to them one or two battalions of militia, independently of the supplement of men per company which they should have received on entering on campaign. In this manner, with a peace establishment of 180,000 men, the regular army might easily have been increased to 250,000 by the first complement, and to 500,000 by the doubling of the militia.

"After the peace of 1762, the French ministry, not knowing to what to attribute its defects, sought, in the most

* It is of the recruiting system of the French army, in 1792, that Jomini is speaking.

minute details of the discipline and instruction of their troops, that which was the effect only of their bad choice of generals, and of the faulty direction of their grand operations.

"They never thought of the dispositions by which battles are to be gained, nor of strategic movements; that is, of marches considered as manœuvres of war; and forgot all the combinations of the direction and employment of masses, to amuse themselves with the most futile accessories. They imagined that the armies of Frederick owed their triumphs to the manner of marching the oblique step, to the cut of their clothes, and to a thousand absurdities scarcely to be believed, if the amusing discussions of this epoch were not yet present to memory, and if a minister had not encouraged them.

"In a monarchy, where the nobility devote themselves to arms, as a profession to which they are obliged by their title, it is easily comprehended that it should enjoy certain favours, and that their services should be remunerated; but in granting them a preference, is it not unjust to exclude from advancement the respectable class of officers of fortune? And is it not still more dangerous to suffer the superior ranks and the chief commands, which *ought to be the rewards of genius*, of *experience*, and of *devotion*, to become the *patrimony* of some privileged circles? An impartial government will never forget, that under Louis XVI., Buonaparte, Moreau, Kleber, and many other celebrated warriors, would have been condemned to an eternal nullity; whilst in the long reign of Louis XV. not *one distinguished* general was to be found amongst the French nobility; Marshal Saxe, the only one who illustrated this epoch, being a stranger.

"In 1792 the general staff of the French army, a corps so essential for the direction of the operations of war, especially in a government in which the monarch is not himself at the head of his armies, had neither the institutions nor

the experience which were desirable: the corps of artillery and engineers, on the contrary, were a nursery of officers as distinguished by their information as by their zeal. Thus the most valuable knowledge and the germs of the greatest talents, were buried in two arms of secondary consideration, in which they served to accessories only, instead of contributing to their own glory, and to that of the army at large, by a happy mixture with the general staff, which would have opened to them a vast career.*

"No power in Europe possessed at this epoch such superior materials for the composition of a general staff as those which then existed in France; and, to the shame of succes-

* The British artillery and engineer officers are, at this day, excluded from the general staff of the army: why, it would be difficult satisfactorily to answer. The truth is, that the re-organization of those corps, and particularly of the artillery, on a system adapted to the present improved nature and increased variety of the service, is a great desideratum in the British army. It might be done, if not with a diminution, at least without an increase of expenditure to the country. To break the artillery into regiments, organized as much as possible on the admirable system of the cavalry and infantry, seems to be the first step towards it, and one by which an unnecessary superfluity of officers at the head of the regiment might be reduced, and a more exact discipline and a rivalry in instruction be procured. To substitute a system of judicious selection, for the present absurd one of promotions by seniority, as the mode of advancement, would be the next. The third would be to allow exchanges between officers of this service and of the other arms, provided that the candidates for the scientific corps had previously passed an examination, in those sciences requisite for the performance of their duties. This general diffusion of military knowledge, in all its branches, might be aided by amalgamating the Artillery and Engineer College at Woolwich with the Military College at Sandhurst, and making it a department of that institution. By this means much expense might be saved, and much good done generally to the army. The last step would be to give every encouragement to the talents of officers of these corps in common with those of the rest of the army, by selecting a general staff from the whole, composed of those most qualified for it by their acquirements and abilities.

sive administrations, it must be allowed that no power had a worse. The ascendancy of their own courage and talents, and the dictatorial authority of the representatives of the people, have indeed brought forward the Klebers, Desaixs, Moreaus, Saint Cyrs, Reyniers, Jourdans, and Soults; but the military institutions did nothing towards it, and an army ought to possess such as shall be above all accidents, and independent of men.

"The cavalry, as brave as any in Europe, was well mounted,* but the regiments were too weak, and the training defective. The *general officers* of this arm also, were *not instructed in the art of moving in great bodies*, according to the nature of the ground. In the subsequent wars the defects of this arm have been in part corrected; and experience, by proving what a good cavalry can do, has also shown how much that of the French stood in need of reform.

"The army of the great Frederick was considered at his death as the first in Europe. Proud of a struggle without example in modern annals, and of the superior genius of their king, they added to this force of opinion a degree of instruction in grand manœuvres, to which the troops of all other powers were far from approaching. A multitude of officers of rival talents were to be found in it.

"Frederick had kept up the emulation and the remembrance of his glorious battles by frequent sham-fights. In these grand manœuvres, in which both sides were represented, he practised his general officers at handling large bodies of troops in all kinds of ground, by regulating their motions according to the position at the moment, to the features of the ground, and to the maxims consecrated by art and experience. In these noble and martial exercises the astonished stranger saw enormous masses of cavalry break into

* See Note to Appendix.

columns by signal, change their direction, conceal their movements from the enemy, suddenly appear on his flank and form upon it with the rapidity of lightning, without deployment, by a simple wheeling up of divisions; it was here again, that, by an opposite movement, he saw the same cavalry break into column, execute by lines a perpendicular change of front to the rear of the enemy, and reform line of battle on their right or left without deployment, as at the battle of Rosbach.

"These manœuvres were thus intended rather for the instruction of the general officers than for that of the troops; they taught them to calculate distances and intervals of time, circumstances often so decisive in war. All the systems of attack and defence, the most advantageous to the different arms, were tried there; as, also, the combination of grand movements, by which a general should overwhelm a part of his enemy's line before his project be discovered; finally, generals here learnt to choose positions, and to place their troops in them so as that they should be screened from similar enterprizes on the part of the enemy; in one word, Frederick made his generals make campaigns in time of peace.

"He did not stop here; and we should overpass the limits of this picture were we to cite all the methods employed by this great king to carry his army to the highest degree of perfection. We have said that the officers vied with each other in the *study of their profession*; in fact, a military circle was formed at Berlin, to which the best informed officers were admitted. In this establishment there was a collection of military works in all languages; the members of the society commented upon these works, discussed the different branches of tactics, and prizes were decreed to those who discovered important principles, or solved questions of major interest. Such an institution was capable of forming great generals; but the nature of the government, and,

above all, the *irrevocable mode of advancement*,* were *invincible obstacles* in their career, and left *those men* to *languish in the subaltern ranks*, who were, perhaps, the most *proper to command*.†

"Under the successor of Frederick, the Prussian army fell from its splendour. Death robbed it of its best officers. The veterans of Leuthen and Torgau passed away. It was soon seen that the *best troops* without a *great* general *could be of little use*.

"England, which since William III. has held out such lofty pretensions, and fought both by sea and land in the four quarters of the globe; forced to support 100,000 sailors or marine soldiers, could not levy from her industrious population as many soldiers as she could wish; in 1792, she had no more than about 30,000 national troops in the three kingdoms, and about as many in the colonies of the two Indies, without comprising the indigenous troops of negroes and sepoys. Accustomed for a length of time to hold in her pay the soldiers of Germany, she then, as at this day, reckoned upon those of Hanover and all the petty princes as her own. Her policy, her gold, her sailors, and her floating citadels, are the *true elements of her power*; the first procures her auxiliaries, the second gives her satellites, and the last assure to her those distant possessions, whence she draws the means of arming one half of Europe against the other.

"We leave to the historians of this period, so fruitful in great events, the care of tracing a picture of it worthy of posterity, and of showing by what concurrence of skill and of general causes the English government has been able to arrive at such strength. The patriotism and energy of the nation, its great character, its institutions, the manœuvres

* By seniority.

† See Note to Appendix.

and machiavelism of its cabinet, the mechanism of its administration, the secret of its credit, the hatreds it has turned to its advantage, the *blindness* of a *part of Europe*, such have been, in a few words, the multiplied sources of England's prosperity; *which, it is to be hoped, for the sake of other nations, has seen its apogee.*"

Here I will close my extracts from De Jomini. The last will show the nature of that jealousy and animosity with which we may be sure that not only the governments, but also the people of the continent, regard the proud pre-eminence of England. We have done them benefits they can never forgive. We have broken the chains under which they groaned, and, but for England, might have groaned at this day; but in doing this, we have displayed a power which they hate and fear; riches which they envy; a firm and steady adherence to principles of justice and moderation which they are incapable of understanding or appreciating. De Jomini, Lacretelle, and other leading writers of the present day, re-echo the war-cry against England; and but lately the public papers teemed with the effusions of their malignity; but let England be true to herself, and the nations of Europe will fail to hurt her. This little work has been compiled with a feeling that it contains more than the mere principles which should serve for the conduct of armies. There are grand manœuvres in policy as well as in war, on the sea as well as on land. Central positions, and combined efforts, are equally applicable to all. We are not the only free and commercial nation on the earth; no, there is another Britain in the New World, whose interest must in the main coincide with ours. Conquest is not the province of either, but *commerce*, which procures us common riches and common enemies. Spain has also made us another ally in South America; and even on the continent of Europe, there must be mutual jealousies and burnings which must render its union insecure. For the rest, we

hold in this little island, a central point, and a *concentrated force* which, if applied with wisdom and energy, must overpower the isolated efforts of the extended continent. Why should we fear the combined navies of Europe, if we can prevent their uniting?

Let this be the principle of our policy, to strike decisive blows with our concentrated forces, upon the detached fragments of our enemies; let us overwhelm them in the very outset of their career, when they first seek to approach each other, and we shall always find ourselves able to compete with, at least, this quarter of the globe.

It is also hoped, that these latter extracts from the Baron de Jomini on the wars of the Revolution, will serve as hints for the improvement of our military system. Excellent as is the constitution of our army generally, we must remember, in the words of De Jomini, that the secret of war is not, and never can be, in the *legs*, but in the head which guides them; and that the principal attention of the government of a great nation should be turned to the formation of good generals; to the maintenance of a superior staff; to the advancement of men of talents of every branch of the service, whether cavalry, infantry, artillery, or engineers; to the instruction of the troops in grand manœuvres, by the formation of camps for that purpose wherever possible; to the perfection of every arm, and of the institutions which support them; and finally, to the improvement of the system of recruiting. In short, it may be said, both of the naval and military services, that *sound policy* and *true* economy require that nothing should be neglected to make the heads that direct, and the arms that strike, as efficient as possible.

NOTE TO APPENDIX.

It is unworthy of England that war is the only science, the study of which is not nationally encouraged. The old prejudices about introducing a disposition to servitude with military feelings cannot be entertained by any liberal and well informed man. Any one acquainted with the principles of our constitution, and who has experienced the benefits resulting therefrom, will not be the less attached to it, because he is a soldier. War will, on the contrary, derive its chief importance to him, from its being a necessary safeguard to our national independence and liberty. We have societies for every purpose, but the encouragement of military science. Now I will ask, what danger could be feared to the constitution, and what advantages might not be procured to the composition of its defenders, if a society were established in London, composed of all the first military and naval characters of the day, with a president and committee, something on the footing of the Royal Society, to meet at certain periods of the year, and to advertize various propositions in military and naval science for the consideration of the officers of the army and navy: offering prizes, medals, &c. for the best treatises on these subjects? The natural consequences of such an institution would be the *creation* of *studious* and *reflective habits* amongst our military and naval men, and the developement of talents, which would otherwise stagnate in idleness and dissipation, or employ their energies on subjects foreign to the service.

Might not also the remount of our cavalry and artillery be effected at a cheaper rate, with better material, and that too of *standard excellence*, if government were to purchase land, and form establishments for breeding horses? Government must always lose in its transactions with individuals. The contractor must always be indemnified for his trouble and risk; besides which *this trade has so often become a stepping stone to riches and honours, and has such a natural tendency to monopolize wealth and power*, that it should be a maxim with all good and particularly free governments to employ it as little as possible. In addition, when the demand ceases, the breeder ceases, and the cavalry horse becomes extinct. Where then, on an emergency, can we look for a sufficient supply of good cattle? I believe this fact has become very evident in Ireland, once so famous for its excellent horses.

Certainly under a proper and economical system of administration, a public establishment in England and one in Ireland would afford a nursery for horses of the first description in the world, and at a lower rate than might at first be imagined, because those horses which might not be eligible for the military services would still find a sale in the private markets. This is a subject not novel perhaps to many reflective military men. Is it not well worthy the consideration of our statesmen? Depôts supplied from the private markets would have the disadvantage of not being able to meet the sudden emergencies of the state, and of being affected, both in price and quality, by the variations in the public demand for horses.

PLATE V.

THE BATTLE OF ROSBACH.

5th November, 1757.

PRUSSIANS.	FRENCH.
A. The combined army under the orders of Soubise, and the Duke of Saxe Hilbourghausen, threatening to march upon Leipsic, Frederick flies to meet it, passes the Saale near Wiessenfeld, and encamps near Wendorff.	
B. The second position he occupies near Schortau.	D. First position of the combined army.
C. March of the King to attack the combined army, which he supposed in its first position.	E. The camp which it occupied, after having changed front and carried its advance guard under the Count de Saint Germain to Groost.
F. The Prussian army returns to the heights of Rosbach.	G. The combined army, leaving a corps of observation on the heights of Almadorff, makes a flank march by Lutschiff upon Reichertswerben, in order to cut off the retreat of the King.
J K. The Prussian cavalry, under the orders of Seidlitz, having changed front to the rear, under cover of the heights of Janus, charges the heads of the columns of Soubise, who imagines he is going to attack the King in flank.	H. The heads of its columns, arrived at the heights of Lundstedt, are charged by the cavalry Seidlitz.
M. The Prince Henry, with eight battalions, seconds this attack.	L. The French, making vain efforts to form their line, are charged again and attacked in flank and forced to retire upon the rear of their columns behind Reitchertswerben (P).

PRUSSIANS.

FRENCH.

N. The rest of the infantry, having followed this movement, forms in a second line as it arrives.

O. These united forces continue to drive before them the platoons of the allies, which are successively overthrown, and they threaten the flank of the army which attempts to rally at P.

R. The king's camp after the battle.

PLATE VIII.

THE BATTLE OF LEUTHEN.

5th December, 1757.

PRUSSIANS.

AUSTRIANS.

A. Prince Charles of Lorraine, after his victory at Breslau and the capture of this town, is informed that the King has arrived from Rosbach and joined the remains of the Duke of Bevern's army—he immediately marches to give him battle, passes the Lohe and takes up a position between Sageschütz and Nissern.

B. The Prince forms a crotchet extending to the pond of Gohlau for to cover his left flank.

C D. The advance guard and army of the King arriving near Borna overthrow the general Nostitz and discover the hostile army.

E. The advance guard advances upon Frobelwitz to deceive the Austrians and molest their right.

PRUSSIANS.	AUSTRIANS.
F. The rest of the army changes direction to its right and marches on the left flank of Nadasty.	
G. The army forms between Sageschutz and Lobetintz.	
H J. The troops drawn up to force Sageschutz and overthrow those which cover the enemy's left flank: Nadasty's cavalry attacks them without success.	
K. A numerous artillery enfilading the Austrian line completes its disorder.	
L. The Prussian army having overthrown the left, advances victoriously upon Leuthen.	M. The Prince of Lorraine, having changed front upon his centre, defends Leuthen.
N O. The cavalry of the right wing makes a successful charge upon the enemy. The hussars of Ziethen pierce the Bavarians and drive the enemy to Leuthen.	P. The right wing is outflanked by the Prussian squadrons and thrown back upon Frobelwitz.
O P. The cavalry of the left wing under general Driesen attacks the right of the Imperials and outflanks them at the same time. It drives their cavalry from the field and then returns upon their infantry, which it throws into the greatest disorder and makes many prisoners.	R. The Imperial army retires in disorder upon Lissa.
S. The King's army pursues the enemy to Gukerwitz and Rathen.	T U. A part of the army flies in small divisions by the Bridges of Rathen and Goldschmeide, the rest by Lissa.
V. The camp which it occupies after the battle.	

PLATE X.

THE BATTLE OF PRAGUE.

18th May, 1757.

PRUSSIANS.

C. The King, marching from Saxony, passes the Moldau opposite to Czimitz and Bohnitz, and joins Schwerin, marching from Brandeis, at D.

E E. The position of the Prussian armies after their junction.

a. The front of the enemy's position being considered too strong, Marshal Schwerin prolongs to the left upon Sterboholi; a manœuvre the more important from its cutting off the enemy from the road to Kollin.

d. Schwerin's infantry, after having overcome the greatest obstacles, attacks the Austrian right wing; but overpowered by the fire of their heavy artillery, it is

AUSTRIANS.

A. Two Prussian armies having invaded Bohemia from Saxony and Silesia, Prince Charles of Lorraine concentrates his disseminated forces upon Prague, for to wait for Daun, on his march from Moravia, and for to receive the attack of the enemy; his army encamps between Kyge and the Criskaberg.

b. Some battalions are placed between Kyge and Loupetin to defend the passage between the two ponds.

F. The Prince of Lorraine refuses his right.

G. The Prussians debouching between Podebernitz and Hostawitz, the infantry of the right wing takes a new position, and furnishes all its front with artillery.

H. All the cavalry forms in three lines near Micholup.

PRUSSIANS.	AUSTRIANS.
driven back upon the ponds, where it is stopped.	
e. After having repulsed the Austrians, who had pursued too hastily, it renews the attack with as little success.	
g. The third attempts of these troops partly in columns and partly in small divisions, in which Marshal Schwerin is killed.	
L. Prince Schoneich's Prussian cavalry, having passed through Micholup, forms upon the left of Schwerin and charges the enemy in vain.	
M. It renews its attempts; Warnery outflanks the imperial right, they are thrown into disorder and driven from the field of battle towards Rostoli in N N.	N. The cavalry and right wing of the Imperials, being separated from their army, retire by Kretsch upon Beneschau.
P. The King debouches with his right by the causeways of Loupetin and Kyge, seizes the hills of Hortlorzes and effects his junction with the troops of Schwerin.	R. The left and centre of the Austrians, being separated from the right, are driven into Prague.
S. His cavalry, formed behind Loupetin, as soon as it can command ground for its formation, establishes itself in T behind the infantry of the right wing.	
U. The two wings advance together against the enemy's line and repulse it as often as it attempts to reform.	
W. The King's army prolonging to Sabietitz, completely cuts off the Austrians from their communications, and throws them into Prague; their right alone retires upon Beneschau.	
Z. The corps of Marshal Keith and Prince Maurice, left on the left bank of the Moldau, afterwards invest Prague on the side of the lesser town.	

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





DEFINITIONS
LINES OF OPERATIONS & MANEUVRE
PLATE I
SINGLE LINE
OF
MANŒUVRE
DOUBLE AND MULTIPLIED
LINES OF MANŒUVRE
INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR
LINES OF MANŒUVRE
DEEP CONCENTRIC
AND
EXCENTRIC LINES
OF MANŒUVRE
SECONDARY LINES
OF
MANŒUVRE


PLATE II











Nesle and Stockley's Lithography, 359 Strand